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Voyage of the Mignonette and the Strange Legal Proceedings to Which
It Gave Rise. By A.W. Brian Simpson.** Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. xiv, 353. $25.00.
Anthony Chaset
For most of this century, university-based legal education in America
has been dominated, to an extent that drives advocates of clinical and of
more analytically oriented legal education to despair, by the close reading
of reported cases. It is remarkable, then, to observe how few really ex-
haustive treatments of particular cases our legal scholarship has generated.
Yet in each of the best of these analyses,' the author is able to reveal how
a particular case-that single unit of law and society-may betray "a
glimpse . . . of a universe in which discontinuous realities are nonetheless
somehow implicated with each other and intertwined, no matter how re-
mote they may at first have seemed." 2
Most readers of this review will have their own list of remarkable indi-
vidual case accounts, to which I think should be added A.W. Brian
Simpson's Cannibalism and the Common Law,3 a fresh look at Regina v.
* Title borrowed from Rainer Werner Fassbinder. See FEAR EATS THE SOUL (R. Fassbinder dir.
1973).
** Professor of Law, University of Chicago and University of Kent.
" Professor of Law, Nova Law Center.
1. See, e.g., J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIEry 315-46 (1935) (on Carrier's Case, Y.B. 13
Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473)); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) (on Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955)); J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 65-110 (on
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)); id., at 111-51 (1976) (on Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)).
2. F. JAMESON, T.W. Adorno; or Historical Tropes, in MARXISM AND FORM 3, 8 (1971).
3. A. SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY OF THE TRAGIC LAST
VOYAGE OF THE Mignonette AND THE STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE
(1984) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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Dudley and Stephens.4 Simpson has researched this famous case of mur-
der and cannibalism at sea expertly and in depth, and has come to the
conclusion that the State's method of conviction might be described, like a
painting of doubtful attribution, as "not quite right."
I.
This book is different from some of Simpson's previous work:' more
readable, more concerned with historical context, and painted with a
broader brush. The author obviously cares about the world of ships and
sailing' and about the nasty mishandling of Dudley and Stephens, sailors
who were accepting of the sea and its ways but out of their depth in the
grasp of devious judges on dry land.
Simpson chooses to structure his story in an almost cinematic way.
Opening his tale in September of 1884, he describes the arrival of three
sailors, Dudley, Stephens, and Brooks, at the Falmouth harbor in Corn-
wall.7 Landed there by a ship that had picked them up at sea, the three
men were relieved to be alive and safely home, and were more than ready
to tell anyone interested, including the local authorities, about their recent
harrowing experience. While delivering the yacht Mignonette from the
south of England to Sydney, Australia, the men had been caught in a
storm that destroyed the yacht and left them stranded without food or
water in a small dinghy at sea. After nineteen or twenty days of terrible
thirst and hunger and desperately clinging to life, Dudley and Stephens
killed the youngest member of the crew, Richard Parker, and ate him.
Captain Dudley stabbed the seventeen-year-old Parker in the neck, thus
ending the lad's first voyage at sea, and the three remaining crew mem-
bers shared in drinking Parker's still warm blood. Over the next four
days, the sailors ate Parker's flesh and organs in the hope of maintaining
their own lives until they might be found.
This initial sequence introduces the reader to the gruesome details of
survival cannibalism, assesses the effect upon Falmouth locals, and espe-
cially upon the authorities, of "the horrid deed,"8 and raises in the
4. 14 Q.B.D. 273, [1881-5] All E.R. Rep. 61, 1 T.L.R. 118 (1884), affg 1 T.L.R. 29 (1884),
amended 14 Q.B.D. 560 (1885).
5. See, e.g., A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONIRAcr (1975); Simpson,
The Honvitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979).
6. As another reviewer has pointed out:
Mr. Simpson presents just enough of the flavor (dare one use [sic] a gustatory allusion) of the
contemporary seafaring culture, and gives one enough indications of the state of technical
knowledge and of the beliefs, lore and experience of sailors to provide a great sense of immedi-
acy in the story he spins. One can fairly smell the docks and feel the wind off the water.
Moore, Sacrificing the Boy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, § 7 (Book Review), at 11.
7. Pp. 1-11.
8. P. 55 (title of Chapter 3).
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reader's mind the pivotal question of whether or not the surviving sailors
had committed a crime.
Simpson then shifts the action from the quite tentative arrest of Dudley
and Stephens by local authorities in Falmouth9 to a panoramic flashback
into the "strange lost world of Victorian yachting."10 This permits
Simpson to discuss the relation between yachting and social class,1 to
draw a meticulous portrait of boats and men, and to describe the back-
ground of the Mignonette and her crew. 2 The suspense builds as the au-
thor recounts the "stress of storm"13 that demolished the Mignonette, the
enveloping agony of hunger, the moment when a certain line was crossed,
and the final rescue and ambiguous return to civilization. Thus while our
"real time" sailors are cooling their heels in the Falmouth police station,
our "flashback" crew is back out on the horrible sea, chased by man-
eating sharks," terrified of drinking seawater, and compelled to drink
their own urine,' while the nearest land was South America, "more than
2,000 miles to the west." '16
Simpson's book, with its narcotic repetition of episodes of cannibalism
and with its clinical objectivity in describing not only boat rigging and
navigational locations but also half-eaten and emaciated corpses, may be
quite disturbing to some readers. But perhaps most will respond to these
details as did Captain Dudley, who wished that the police would return to
him as a memento the penknife he used to cut open Parker's throat;17 or
like most of the popular audience of the day, who joined in ballads and
drinking songs celebrating the tragic heroes of the Mignonette"8 while
waiting expectantly for the waxwork model of Captain Dudley to open at
Madame Tussaud's exhibition. 9
To return to Simpson's narrative: Parker had lost control over his abil-
ity to resist drinking seawater, and he began to experience violent ill-
ness-in addition to maddening thirst and hunger. On July 24th at dawn,









17. P. 7. But even Dudley seemed about to unravel at times. See, e.g., p. 76 ("Daniel (Richard
Parker's brother) traveled at once to Falmouth, arriving on Tuesday evening at the police station.
There Dudley heard him talking to Superintendent Bourne and called out, 'Why, that's little Dick's
voice!'").
18. Pp. 84-86, 253-55, 313-22.
19. P. 248.
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probably not of Brooks,"0 killed Richard Parker. Although there had been
some discussion of drawing lots to see who should be killed, in the end it
appears that Parker was chosen without lottery because he was not mar-
ried and because he seemed closest to death already."1
After the perilously weak and dehydrated sailors had lived for four days
off the carcass, the German sailing barque Moctezuma appeared on the
horizon, picked them up, and returned them to the predicament in which
the harbor police and Simpson had previously left them: waiting in frus-
tration and complete disbelief to find out if they would actually be
charged with murder for doing what they surely had to do. 2
II.
At this point, many readers will want to know the "bottom
line"-guilty, not guilty, or no prosecution-and will be impatient to
compare notes with the jury that tried Dudley and Stephens. But the
reader has yet to find out that Dudley and Stephens' jury never actually
passed judgment. Key facts leading to the ambiguous death sentences have
yet to be established. It is in this central section of the book that Simpson
makes a genuinely original contribution to the debate over one of the lead-
ing cases in the history of the British criminal law.
What are the important facts which Simpson brings out of the wood-
work of these nineteenth-century vessels that traversed such great ex-
panses of empty water? Simpson demonstrates with example after exam-
ple that: (1) cannibalism with respect to passengers or crew who died of
natural causes on seemingly doomed voyages was common;23 (2) cannibal-
ism with respect to passengers or crew not yet dead but killed to be eaten
20. Pp. 63-65.
21. Pp. 6, 62, 65-66.
22. Pp. 10, 70-72.
23. Pp. 114-22. Summarizing the detailed research upon which his conclusion is founded, Simp-
son observes, "So normal was cannibalism that on some occasions survivors found it appropriate to
take pains to volunteer denial that cannibalism had occurred; suspicion of this practice among starv-
ing castaways was a routine reaction." P. 121.
Simpson's many examples of such survival cannibalism during the nineteenth century include those
mentioned in the Commons debate on the Unseaworthy Ships Bill of 1875 by Samuel Plimsoll,
such as that of the Anna Maria where "part of the leg of a woman was found which evidently
served the crew for food." Plimsoll mentioned two other cases . . . in one of which "four
bodies were found under the maintop, all dead, with part of one of their comrades hung up, as
if in a butcher's shop."
Pp. 120-21.
After the timber ship Francis Mary became disabled off Newfoundland:
the crew began to die. John Wilson died on February 22 and was quartered and hung up for
food; the next day, I. Moore died, and his liver and heart were eaten. Matters went from bad
to worse, and when the cook, James Friar, died, Ann Saunders, his betrothed and a passenger,
cut his throat and claimed prior property rights in his blood.
P. 126.
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was also common;2" and (3) it was unusual that stranded and desperate
human beings would play the game of death by rules, drawing lots fairly
to determine who would be sacrificed. 5
All of this places in sharp contrast much that happened to Dudley and
Stephens once back on land: the actual decision to prosecute them,26 the
24. One case mentioned by Simpson is that of the Tiger.
The Tiger was shipwrecked in 1766, and in Peter Viaud's story of it, once matters became
critical, "it came into Viaud's recollection that mariners had cast lots who should die to keep
their comrades from famine. His eyes lighted on the negro youth. ... His companion,
Mine. la Couture, had the same idea about the same time, and the formality of casting lots was
dispensed with, though some time was directed to "bitterly bewailing his fate." The unfortu-
nate man, who appears to have been a slave, was killed and indeed smoked.
P. 125.
Another case, this one from the nineteenth century, when such wrecks were most frequent, was that
of the Brig Caledonia, "a typical story of a waterlogged timber ship, where the men near to death
had their throats cut for blood. They were self-selected . . . ." P. 128.
25. There are sufficiently many examples of genuine lot drawing for Simpson to conclude that the
practice can be regarded as an element within the "custom of the sea." P. 144. Yet the following
example, describing the wreck of the Peggy, illustrates that procedural niceties such as a fair lottery
were by no means always observed:
Led by the mate, the crew burst in on the captain, and, with "countenances of the most fright-
ful ghastliness" announced that they would have to draw lots. Captain Harrison attempted to
buy time, but the crew left him and then returned, saying they had already cast lots and that
"the lot had fallen on the negro who was part of the cargo." The unfortunate slave attempted
to escape but was dragged on deck and shot by a sailor by the name of Doud. It strains
credulity to suppose that lots were fairly cast. After another sailor, James Campbell, ate the
liver raw, elaborate culinary activities commenced, including an attempt to pickle the body.
P. 124.
Repeatedly, in Simpson's illustrations, blacks and foreign nationals, boys and apprentices, somehow
manage to draw the short straw or else are killed and eaten outright. See, e.g., pp. 131-32 (describing
events aboard derelict Francis Spaight); supra note 24.
For a fictional account of a bungled attempt to cheat in such a lottery, see E. POE, THE NARRA-
TIVE OF ARTHUR GORDON PYM 108 (New York 1838). This story, discussed by Simpson at p. 144,
includes events astonishingly similar to those which actually occurred in the case of Dudley and Ste-
phens half a century after Poe wrote his story. For example, the sailor killed and eaten in Poe's
account is named Richard Parker.
26. Pp. 73-94. On the contrast with prior episodes, see p. 212 (quoting defense summation in
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens) ("'Although they all knew that unfortunate men had in many in-
stances been driven by stress of hunger and thirst to feed upon their fellow creatures, no government
of any civilized country had in any case prosecuted the unhappy survivors on a charge of murder."').
Consider also the incident of the Francis Spaight:
[A]lthough [the owner] Francis Spaight was himself a justice of the peace, no legal proceedings
against captain or crew were apparently even contemplated. Press reports emphasized the suf-
ferings of the survivors . . . . Particularly distressed by the whole affair was [eaten appren-
tice] Patrick O'Brien's mother. . . . She went to Francis Spaight's country house, "where her
hysterical cries were truly heart-rendering [sic]."
P. 133 (quoting an account in the Limerick Times).
[O]n July 30 [Captain Gorman, former captain of the Francis Spaight] took proceedings
against [the mother] in the Limerick magistrates court. According to the only extended account,
"Captain Gorman said he had had no peace for the last week on account of the defendant,
who threatened to take away his life and his children [sic] as well." She denied this, saying
"that all that she did was to fall on her knees, to beg he would tell her about her son that was
killed, and instead of doing so, he abused her." She was duly bound over to keep the Queen's
peace in the only legal proceedings to arise out of the death of her son.
P. 135.
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moral indignation with which some received news of the sailors' conduct,2"
and the dissatisfaction expressed when people learned that no lottery had
been used to select Richard Parker as the one to die.2" Yet it would have
been extraordinary, in the context encountered by the sailors of the Mi-
gnonette, had the crew rationally debated short and long straws versus
"think of a number," or had they waited passively in a pool of excrement
for savage thirst, unbearable hunger, and perhaps reactive psychosis29 to
signal that their lives were over.
It must have taken Simpson years to do the research for this section of
Cannibalism and the Common Law, and it works as he no doubt in-
tended: The upper class judges and government officials as well as the
handful of comfortable newspaper editors who condemn Dudley and Ste-
phens come to seem atrocious hypocrites. At the same time, in an odd way
which I do not think Simpson intended, this accumulation of stories of the
species in extremis (deceiving each other, mutilating each other, tossing
each other overboard, ultimately eating each other-sometimes almost
with pleasure) becomes quite depressing, so that far from expecting too
27. The Standard, for example, editorialized that it was "'impossible to justify such revolting
acts; even wild beasts will often die rather than eat their own species."' P. 251. Popular feeling,
however, generally ran in support of Dudley and Stephens, and certain sectors of opinion, sailors and
their families, for example, strongly protested the notion that the men should be prosecuted.
Pp. 84-86, 89-91. But once Dudley and Stephens were convicted of murder, Simpson suggests that
public opinion began to turn against them. "[T]his indeed was the whole function of the legal deci-
sion." P. 242.
28. P. 84 (quoting Southampton Times report that "'many of the briny fraternity complain that
an equality of chance was not given to the four exhausted survivors by the casting of lots."' But cf.
p. 250 ("[T]he Saturday Review, agreeing with the judges, described the notion that it was legitimate
to draw lots in such circumstances as a 'blasphemous absurdity' and the act of the two men as 'a very
base and wicked act."').
29. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
ORDERS 200 (3d ed. 1980):
The essential feature is the sudden onset of a psychotic disorder of at least a few hours' but no
more than two weeks' duration . . . The psychotic symptoms appear immediately following
a recognizable psychosocial stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost
anyone. The precipitating event may be any major stress, such as the loss of a loved one or the
psychological trauma of combat. . . . Behavior may be bizarre and include peculiar postures,
outlandish dress, screaming, or muteness. Suicidal or aggressive behavior may also be present.
Speech may include inarticulate gibberish or repetition of nonsensical phrases. Affect is often
inappropriate and volatile. Transient hallucinations or delusions are common.
The case of the Peggy provides an example:
Three days later Campbell went mad and died; fearing to contract madness from his body, the
others threw it overboard. . . . [Tihe slave's body lasted from January 17 to January 26, and
then lots were cast again. . . . The lot fell on Richard (or David) Flat, a "seaman much
beloved on board." Flat accepted with resignation and asked Doud to shoot him. But Doud
could not bring himself to do so, and after a short prayer some attempted to catch fish ....
But the strain on the unhappy Flat was too much. By midnight he was deaf, and in two or
three hours raving mad.
P. 124.
The insanity defense or perhaps the defense of diminished capacity might today play a role, which
it did not in the past, in the defense of persons charged with homicide for survival cannibalism. See
p. 233 (discussing defenses of insanity and diminished responsibility).
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much of Dudley and Stephens, we begin to take it for granted that, being
human, Dudley and Stephens were also no doubt acting inhumanly. The
predictability of such behavior is a good reason for not punishing them,
but it also leads us to develop a certain unexpected uneasiness toward
them-perhaps because we fear the sight in them of our reflection-that
attenuates our advocacy on their behalf. Yet perhaps we should simply be
thankful that Simpson has shown up the other side as being such a dis-
honest and sanctimonious bunch. Simpson's accumulation of grisly details
convincingly supports his indictment of the judges' self-righteousness.
The second issue on which Simpson casts new light concerns what went
wrong on the way to the jury's verdict. "Central to the approach of Sir
William Harcourt, the home secretary," according to Simpson, "appears
to have been revulsion against the popular idea that Dudley was a
hero." 30 Thus it comes as no surprise that the state was worried about
whether it could find a jury that would convict Dudley and Stephens.
What is surprising, however, is Simpson's revelation of the extent to
which the state was willing to savage existing procedural rules, virtually
bypassing the jury in order to place the fate of Dudley and Stephens in
the hands of judges who had already decided what the outcome would
be.31 In an examination as intricate as his discussion of the "custom of the
sea" was exhaustive, Simpson demonstrates that: (1) the trial judge,
Baron Huddleston, had by the time of the grand jury proceeding already
decided that necessity was no defense at common law, and he did not
permit defense counsel to argue the necessity defense at trial;32 (2) the
same judge prevented the jury from making even a contingent decision on
the question of guilt or innocence, contingent, that is, upon subsequent
judicial determination of the legal question regarding the existence of a
necessity defense;33 (3) Huddleston wrote the text for the jury's findings in
30. P. 89.
31. Pp. 195-229. Compare with the following statement of the sacredness, in England, of the
right to a jury trial:
If I turn to an eighteenth-century compendium of the laws which was placed by the desk of
every JP at that time, and turn up the entry under "Jurors," I find that the normally busi-
nesslike author suddenly breaks into eloquence: "Trial by juries is the Englishman's birth
right, and it is that happy way of trial, which notwithstanding all revolutions of the times,
hath been continued beyond all memory to this present day; the beginning whereof no history
specifies, it being contemporary with the foundations of this state, and one of the pillars of it,
both as to age and consequence."
E. THOMPSON, The State of the Nation, in WRITING BY CANDLELIGHT 191, 229 (1980) (quoting R.
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (1754)).
32. Pp. 200-02 (recounting "highly exceptional and indeed irregular" procedure followed by
Baron Huddleston).
33. Pp. 208-10 (describing how Baron Huddleston pressured jury to agree to special verdict that
reserved key legal question of necessity defense for appellate court while preventing jury from decid-
ing on guilt or innocence).
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its special verdict34 and even tampered with it after it was approved by the
jury in order to avoid new defense arguments pertaining to jurisdictional
issues.3 5 In Simpson's telling, the appellate court's determination of the
key question of guilt or innocence in the guise of merely resolving a legal
point regarding the necessity defense appears as an outrageous yet nearly
foregone conclusion.3 6 In terms of procedural integrity, this is Anglo-
American justice at its worst.
Simpson is firm in his insistence that a condemnation for murder was
precisely the state's purpose almost from the beginning of the sailors' legal
ordeal. The public by and large supported the pardoning of Dudley and
Stephens should they be found guilty of murder, and, indeed, there was
considerable expectation both in and out of the legal system that the death
sentences pronounced upon them would not be carried out.31 Their
sentences were in fact commuted to six months' imprisonment,38 but no
one could have been quite certain what was to happen to them when they
"were called to stand and told, 'You have been convicted of murder. What
have you to say why the Court should not give you judgment to die?"' 39
III.
There are two weaknesses in Simpson's analysis of the case of Dudley
and Stephens. The first concerns his theory of why the legal system did
not simply ignore the two sailors instead of bringing them to trial and
predetermined conviction. The second is his inattention to the opinion ren-
dered by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge for the appellate court, which, as
Simpson observes, actually constituted the verdict in the case.
Running through the book is an undercurrent of assumption on the
author's part that the purpose of the prosecution was to delegitimate the
"custom of the sea" and to persuade the order of seamen that they were
governed, on sea as well as on land, by the same laws as everybody else.
Those laws were made, as Dudley and Stephens were to be forcefully
reminded, not by the members of the "briny fraternity,"' but rather by
the elite members of the legal fraternity in London. Yet this otherwise
exhaustively documented book presents little evidence to support the idea
34. P. 213.
35. P. 218.
36. See pp. 227-29 (describing how Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, author of appellate opinion,
amended jury's findings to include a conditional verdict). Compare Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 1
T.L.R. 118, 125 (1884) (reporter giving first version of special verdict) with Regina v. Dudley and




40. See supra note 28.
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that this policy goal was what motivated the prosecution of Dudley and
Stephens.
When considering, for example, the legal system's option of having ju-
ries decide, without judicial interference or guidance, the difficult ques-
tions raised by the necessity defense, Simpson observes that this option
was out of the question "if the custom of the sea was to be declared bad as
a matter of law."4 Repeating this argument as a preface to his assault on
the devious Baron Huddleston, Simpson asserts:
Frustrated 10 years earlier in their attempt to bring the custom of
the sea before a court of law for condemnation, the officials of the
Home Office and that of [sic] the treasury solicitor may have taken
particular pains over the prosecution of the latest cannibals to land
in England, but most of the preparatory work is undocumented.4"
By "10 years earlier," Simpson means 1874-the year of the Euxine
incident. In that case, the British Home Office had declined to prosecute
an instance of survival cannibalism not very different from that of Dudley
and Stephens. When the Euxine caught fire off St. Helena in 1874, cap-
tain and crew abandoned her and set off in lifeboats.4 3 One of the boats
lost contact with the others and was eventually cast adrift, as in so many
other disheartening accounts recorded by Simpson. "The following day
a small sail was set, and the five survivors continued their voyage,
now become all but hopeless. The men included a small, dark-skinned
Italian boy of about 20, who spoke very little English."44 The reader can
easily guess who had the misfortune of drawing the short straw in the
lottery.
Simpson canvasses a number of authorities without coming to any cer-
tain conclusion as to the shared motives of the key actors in the Euxine
episode. Thomas Gray of the Board of Trade's Marine Department
doubted a jury would convict. Nor, apparently, would he: "My view is
that no crime was committed in killing and eating a fellow seafarer under
these circumstances." 45 The Colonial Office did not pursue a British pros-
ecution at least in part because it was aware that "the Home Office would
be displeased if the home government had to bear the cost of a trial that
should have taken place in the colonies at colonial expense." '46 With re-
gard to the Home Office itself, Simpson merely observes that "the papers
41. P. 236. See also p. 234 ("the whole point of the prosecution was to reject the barbarous
practices of seamen").
42. P. 195.
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had no doubt been circulating, but. . . it is not possible to reconstruct the
stages in [their] circulation or tell who was consulted."' 47 The home secre-
tary simply did not believe that the case of the Euxine was one "in which
it would be advisable to institute proceedings against these men."4 To this
Simpson adds: "That was that."'49 There is nothing here about a frus-
trated attempt to bring the custom of the sea before a court of law for
condemnation.
Similarly, the motives of the key actors in the prosecution of Dudley
and Stephens are quite opaque. The harbor police in Falmouth arrested
Dudley because, given his story, it would have been difficult not to detain
him and the decision to prosecute would not be theirs. 0 The Home Office,
as Simpson himself indicates, apparently went ahead with a trial to
counteract the popular toleration-even celebration-of the Mignonette's
survivors. 5 1 Sir Henry James, a law officer to the Home Office, advised
the home secretary that Dudley and Stephens should be prosecuted, and
indicated that if they were not convicted he would "'decline for the future
to sit near any man with a large appetite."' 52 James added, however, that
"'[w]hen convicted you can let them off."' ' 53 Leniency was justified by the
fact that Dudley and Stephens had been "'in a state of comparative
phrensy quite upsetting the ordinary balance of the mind.'
' 54
After careful consideration, Home Secretary Harcourt (who, it will be
recalled, had originally decided to proceed with a trial of Dudley and
Stephens) determined that the death sentences should be commuted to
brief terms of imprisonment. Harcourt's son had warned him that "'it
would be very mischievous to excite sympathy with [Dudley and
Stephens] by the infliction of a long term of imprisonment."' 5 On the
other side of the ledger, Harcourt weighed a concrete fear of what might
come from a full pardon: "'If to kill an innocent person to save your own
life is an act deserving of pardon, by what right can a Fenian assassin be
47. P. 191.
48. P. 191. Simpson also suggests a plausible political motive for the Home Office's reluctance to
prosecute: "The crew of a ship owned by a prominent Conservative ship-owner, himself notorious
among seamen for starving his crews, had actually been reduced to eating each other. This would
hardly have been welcomed politically, whatever the outcome of the case might be. . . ." P. 192. But




51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
52. P. 246 (quoting letter from Sir Henry James to Sir William Harcourt (n.d.)).
53. P. 246 (quoting letter from Sir Henry James to Sir William Harcourt (n.d.)).
54. P. 246 (quoting letter from Sir Henry James to Sir William Harcourt (n.d.)).
55. P. 247 (quoting journal of Lewis Harcourt (Dec. 8, 1884)).
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punished who kills because the lot has fallen upon him to do the murder
and if he does not execute it he knows his own life will be forfeited[?I'"58
As to Baron Huddleston, the trial judge, there is only a hint of evidence
that he was trying to overturn the "custom of the sea." According to
Simpson, the Baron had been judge advocate of the fleet. He was up-
wardly mobile and a snob. "[P]resumably the only judge who had been
directly involved with naval discipline was the obvious man to be sent
there to do what had to be done, particularly as he had a reputation for
getting his own way with juries and was well known in the West Coun-
try."' 57  Simpson has nothing to say about the motivations of Lord
Coleridge, author of the procedurally anomalous Queen's Bench Division
opinion.
Based on Simpson's evidence, it makes as much sense to regard the
treatment of Dudley and Stephens as designed to send a message to the
Fenian assassin, that is, the Irish nationalist terrorist, as to likely follow-
ers of the "custom of the sea" at the end of the era of the great sailing
ships. If it was specifically the custom of the sea that the mandarins of the
legal system were after, one wonders why they waited until the end of the
nineteenth century. Simpson's explanation, although plausible, is undocu-
mented and incomplete. Where, then, can we look for further explanation
of why it was so important to prosecute and convict these cannibals when
so many others had been pitied or hailed but left alone?
IV.
An obvious place to look for this explanation would be Lord Chief
Justice Coleridge's opinion in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,"8 which
occupies but ten pages of the Law Reports. Yet this opinion, in which
Coleridge manipulates doctrine with the same vigor as his colleague
Huddleston manipulated procedure, is neither reprinted nor analyzed by
56. P. 247. (quoting letter from Sir William Harcourt to Lewis Harcourt (n.d.)). Cf F. HARRI-
SON, THE DARK ANGEL: ASPECTS OF VIcrORIAN SEXUALITY 64 (1977):
Although Britain enjoyed an enviably peaceful political atmosphere by contemporary stan-
dards, [the late-Victorian period] was an age of terrorism. All over Europe extremists of vari-
ous denominations, particularly anarchists, were putting into action their belief in "propa-
ganda by deed" by not only assassinating, or attempting to, presidents and other prominent
citizens, but by also indiscriminately bombing and murdering ordinary members of the bour-
geoisie. Political violence in Britain was mostly confined to Ireland, and to Irish issues, with
occasional outbreaks of bombing in London, but the property-owning classes nevertheless ab-
sorbed the general air of apprehension generated by events which befell their neighbours across
the Channel.
57. P. 198. See also pp. 197-98 (noting that Huddleston may also have been reacting against "the
ugly reality of the sailor's world which he had learned many years earlier from his father," who had
also been in the navy).
58. 14 Q.B.D. 273, [1881-5] All E.R. Rep. 61, 1 T.L.R. 118 (1884).
1263
The Yale Law Journal
the author.59 Careful analysis of what Coleridge is up to would have deep-
ened Simpson's criticism of the legal process afforded Dudley and
Stephens.
Although Simpson does evaluate some of the theoretical bases for the
defense of necessity in criminal law,6" he gives insufficient weight to the
legally recognized arguments that would have supported the conduct of
Dudley and Stephens.6
Consider, for example, the defense of necessity as grounded in self-
preservation. Neither Coleridge in his opinion, nor Simpson in his book,
quotes Blackstone's statement, recited at oral argument by Dudley and
Stephens' counsel:
There is one species of homicide se defendendo, where the party
slain is equally innocent as he who occasions his death: and yet this
homicide is also excusable from the great universal principle of self-
preservation, which prompts every man to save his own life prefera-
bly to that of another, where one of them must inevitably perish.
6 2
Yet there was sufficient recognition of Blackstone's "species of homicide se
defendendo" for Cambridge University professor E.C. Clark to write, in
his little "restatement" of criminal law published four years before Dud-
ley and Stephens were tried, that:
Self-defense or, more properly, self-preservation is the overpow-
ering motive in that hypothetical case of unavoidable necessity,
which Blackstone recognizes as constituting, if not a legal involuntar-
iness, at least an absolute excuse for homicide . . . . The principle
of self-preservation, extended to the case of others whom the agent
was bound to protect, is generalized by Sir James Stephen, under the
head of necessity, into an excuse of acts done, only in order to avoid
consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which
would have inflicted upon the agent, or such other persons, inevita-
ble and irreparable evil, provided no more is done than was reason-
ably necessary for the purpose, and the evil inflicted is not dispro-
portionate to the evil avoided. This is at any rate good sense, and
should be law.6"
The concluding sentence reveals Regius Professor Clark to be a good
59. Simpson does reprint the jury's special verdict, but he spends only one page analyzing Lord
Coleridge's opinion. P. 238.
60. Pp. 230-36.
61. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759-829 (1978) (discussing necessity de-
fense); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 722-46 (2d ed. 1961) (same).
62. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *186, quoted by Arthur Collins, defense counsel, Regina
v. Dudley and Stephens, 1 T.L.R. at 121.
63. E. CLARK, AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 35-36 (1880).
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deal more candid than most modern "restaters." But what is most inter-
esting is his mention of Stephen's extension of the necessity defense,"
placing it upon a new theoretical foundation: that of utility. Indeed, it is
upon this ground that the contemporary defense of necessity in the United
States is usually based.6 5
Simpson permits the Lord Chief Justice's analysis to go unchallenged.
Coleridge treats what is arguably a classic utility case, since the sailors
killed one man to save three (and even justified their decision in utilitarian
terms), 8 as a homicide which could be justified only by self-defense or
self-preservation.17 Since Parker had not attacked anyone, Coleridge ap-
propriately rejects self-defense; he also rejects self-preservation on the
ground that such a rule would violate the principle that no person's life is
worth more than another's.68
The self-defense and self-preservation situations discussed by Coleridge
entail the loss of one life in order to avoid the loss of one other life, the
sole question being who shall die. These situations therefore do not pose a
utilitarian problem. By focusing on them, Coleridge avoids having to ap-
ply Stephen's utilitarian rule. Coleridge cannot, however, ignore Cicero's
hypothetical situation of "the two drowning men and the plank adequate
to support only one." 9 This hypothetical has fascinated legal thinkers for
centuries because it presents the dilemma of whether one should be ex-
cused for causing the other's death or whether the law should require that
both die. Yet Coleridge treats even this hypothetical as if it were an ordi-
nary case of self-preservation rather than a case of utility, and Simpson
fails to point out what Coleridge wishes to bury: the argument that the
drowning man may keep hold of the plank, not merely to save himself,
but because it is better that one rather than two should die. Coleridge's
analysis obscures the fact that Parker's death may have saved the lives of
three men.
Stephen commented on Lord Coleridge's opinion three years later:
64. Simpson observes that "Stephen's Homicide Law Amendment Bill of 1874 embodied a de-
fense of necessity, which he defended before a select committee against criticisms from the senior
judges." P. 235. Stephen, whose views had been cited by the defense in Dudley, expressed agreement
with the court's judgment. P. 248. Nevertheless, contrary to what Simpson suggests, he had not
changed his mind with respect to the necessity defense. See infra notes 70 & 71 and accompanying
text.
65. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962): ("Conduct which the
actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided
that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged; ... "); see also G. FLErcHER, supra note 61, at
818-29.
66. Pp. 61-63.
67. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 281-86.
68. Id. at 287.
69. P. 230.
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I should have agreed with the rest of the Court had I been a member
of it in R. v. Dudley though not in all the reasoning of the judgment.
I should have based my judgment on the fact that the special verdict
found only that if the boy had not been killed and eaten the survivors
"would probably not have survived;" and on the principle that in
this particular class of cases an error on the side of severity is an
error on the safe side. . . . I could not go so far as to say, as the
judgment delivered by Lord Coleridge says, that any case can impose
on a man "a duty" (if the word means a legal duty) "not to live but
to die." . . . Whatever estimate may be formed of self-sacrifice, it
seems to me to be a duty of which the law can take no notice, if
indeed it is a duty at all, which is not a legal question.
70
Now that is good, old, hard-headed liberalism!
It is significant that Stephen might well have applied the defense of
necessity in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens to exculpate the defen-
dants71-had the jury not found that Parker's death only probably saved
the others.72 This brings us back to the central accomplishment of Simp-
son's research: its specificity with regard to what rarely shows up in the
case reports or the digests. Simpson brings out that on this very point
Baron Huddleston altered the jury's findings:
The foreman also said that, in the jury's view, "they would have
died if they had not had this body to feed on." Baron Huddleston
mendaciously steamrollered in reply, "That is as I put it." It was
not; he read out the text, which was as follows: "That if the men
had not fed upon the body of the boy they would probably [Simp-
son's emphasis] not have survived .... ,,73
Italics in Simpson's report and italics in Stephen's-but no italics in the
case report. And Huddleston, addressing the jurors, no doubt said the
70. J. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 37 n.2 (7th ed. 1926).
71. Stephen's utilitarianism led him to justify the necessity defense even in the hardest case: that
in which one man kills several others to save his own life. "Several men are roped together on the
Alps. They slip, and the weight of the whole party is thrown on one, who cuts the rope in order to
save himself. Here the question is not whether some shall die, but whether one shall live." Id. That
the life saved belongs to the actor is pure coincidence as far as utility theory is concerned. It is just a
question of mathematics.
72. Simpson points out the obvious rejoinder:
Since men can adapt their actions only to what they expect to happen, not on [sic] what does in
fact happen (for then it is too late), a utilitarian theory of necessity must be based on what the
individuals foresee. This was appreciated in U.S. v. Holmes [26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1842) (No. 15,383)] by Holmes' counsel, who ridiculed the prosecutor's contrary thesis. "They
ask us to wait until the boat has sunk. We may, then, make an effort to prevent her from
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word in a way they really did not notice. Clearly, a more rigorous exami-
nation of Lord Coleridge's opinion and its doctrinal foundation would
have provided Simpson, with further grounds for his systematic and mea-
sured suspicion of everything surrounding the conviction of Dudley and
Stephens.
V.
If Simpson's explanation that the "custom of the sea" was a target of
the legal elite is insufficient, there are some general characteristics of late-
Victorian society that might add another dimension to our understanding
of why the legal system was so reluctant to recognize a defense of neces-
sity in this case of survival cannibalism, and of why Lord Coleridge de-
scribed the defense, with some hyperbole, as "the legal cloak for unbridled
passion and atrocious crime."1
7 4
According to Fraser Harrison,
The distinction to be drawn between the preceding years and the
final three decades of the century is the presence of a deeply dis-
turbing sense of fear. Although the country was not plunged into
revolution, nor submerged by financial ruin, nor even overpowered
by atheists, socialists or advocates of free-love, the middle-class imag-
ination was persistently haunted by the fear that these catastrophes
were about to come to pass. The old mid-Victorian world, its values
and affluence, its spiritual and commercial confidence, its comforting
belief in the rectitude of everyone knowing his or her place and its
robust faith in its own progress, all seemed to be crumbling into
chaos. 5
With social catastrophe threatening from without and "unbridled pas-
sion" threatening from within, the late-Victorian judicial mind may well
have been averse to tolerating excuses for eating human flesh. Late-
Victorian society, like any other, was defined as much by what it excluded
as by what it included, as much by its fears as by its aspirations.7 ' Canni-
balism, of course, had never met with societal approbation, but the fact
that cases similar to that of Dudley and Stephens had not previously been
prosecuted suggests that cannibalism had been viewed as excusable and
74. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 288.
75. F. HARRISON, supra note 56, at 64. For similar, if less strongly stated, views of this period,
see E. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL 303-08 (1975); D. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROME-
THEUS 231-32 (1969). Another source of anxiety among late-Victorian men was the transformation of
sexual roles and relationships. See F. HARRISON, supra note 56, at 118 (describing "turmoil and
anxiety" provoked by "radical alteration in the relationships between the sexes").
76. See generally M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILZATION (1965) (using changing societal
views of madness to illuminate other aspects of culture and society).
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perhaps even natural in the desperate circumstances of the lifeboat. In the
late-Victorian era, the perception of cannibalism changed: It came to be
feared as a loosening of the strictures of morality, a bursting forth of un-
controlled instinctual passions. Anthropological theories of social evolu-
tion, conveniently legitimating imperialism abroad and inequality at
home, expressed the belief that cannibalism had once been universal, and
that only the restraints imposed on instinct by the progress of civilization
kept humankind from relapsing into anthropophagy."
This view of cannibalism arose naturally in a society whose ascendant
bourgeoisie "defined itself morally against the promiscuous proletariat and
the sensual nobility as the class with virtuous self-denial. 1 87 Joseph
Conrad's perspective, described by his friend Bertrand Russell, was em-
blematic: "He thought of civilized and morally tolerable human life as a
dangerous walk on a thin crust of barely cooled lava which at any mo-
ment might break and let the unwary sink into fiery depths." 9 Simpson's
book, while detailed and revealing, fails to relate the judicial reaction to
cannibalism to this cultural world of late-Victorian England.
The late nineteenth century was a period of exaltation of the will-the
belief that disciplined exertion of will power in opposition to the lower,
more animal, self was the only thing keeping society from anarchy, chaos,
and "atrocious crime." No excuse or justification, not even those of
utilitarian conduct or self-preservation, could be admitted. The smallest
slip backward by the forces of the will, perpetually warring with the se-
duction of submission, might mean that all would be lost.80 "[A] man has
no right to declare temptation to be an excuse," stated Coleridge."' "[I]t is
enough in a Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great Example
whom we profess to follow. It is not needful to point out the awful danger
of admitting the principle which has been contended for." 2 For Lord
77. Pp. 112-14 (describing 19th-century theories of cannibalism). See also F. GILBERT, THE END
OF THE EUROPEAN ERA 31-32 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing use of racism and social darwinism to
rationalize contradiction between liberal ideal of equality on the one hand and inequality and imperi-
alism on the other); E. HOBSBAWM, supra note 75, at 265-68 (discussing development of racist and
evolutionary physical and social anthropology).
78. M. POSTER, CRITICAL THEORY OF THE FAMILY 169 (1978).
79. B. RUSSELL, PORTRAITS FROM MEMORY 82 (1956).
80. A. FELLMAN & M. FELLMAN, MAKING SENSE OF SELF: MEDICAL ADVICE LITERATURE IN
LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 133 (1981) ("Thus the entire ideological construct which
culminated in the will was very fragile. Fear of disorder and chaos paralleled belief in self-control and
the will. Perhaps evil resided in humankind's natural biological state ...."). Cf. Clark, The Rejec-
tion of Psychological Approaches to Mental Disorder in Late Nineteenth-Century British Psychiatry,
in MADHOUSES, MAD-DOcroRs, AND MADMEN 271, 274-75 (A. Scull ed. 1981) (describing late-
Victorian view of mental illness as failure of control by the will over imagination and instincts).
81. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 288.
82. Id. at 287.
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Coleridge, the true source of the principle of necessity was Satan himself.
Quoting Milton's Paradise Lost he warned:
"So spake the Fiend, and with necessity,
The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds.""3
83. Id. at 288 (quoting J. MILTON, PARADISE LosT Bk. IV, lines 393-94 (Satan justifies as
necessary his plan to tempt Eve into violating dietary prohibition on eating from Tree of
Knowledge)).
The "crime" of cannibalism may be approached, in its symbolic aspect, as a matter of fundamental
transgression of a dietary prohibition. Drawing upon anthropology, psychoanalysis, and semiology,
Julia Kristeva argues:
In order to understand. . . the introduction of a meat diet, one must assume a cataclysm-
a violation of divine rule and subsequent punishment. It is indeed only after the Flood
that authorization is granted to eat "every moving thing that liveth" (Genesis 9:3). Far from
being a reward, such permission is accompanied by an acknowledgment of essential evil, and it
includes a negative, incriminating connotation with respect to man: "For the imagination of
man's heart is evil" (Genesis 8:21). As if there had been an acknowledgment of a bent toward
murder essential to human beings and the authorization for a meat diet was the recognition of
that ineradicable "death drive," seen here under its most primordial or archaic
aspect-devouring.
J. KRISTEVA, THE POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY IN ABJECTION 96 (1982).
This association of man as carnivore with man as sadistic murderer and naturally aggressive per-
sonality persists in a strand of 20th-century psychology and anthropology. Commenting upon this line
of analysis, anthropologists Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin state:
The idea was proposed that man is unswervingly aggressive, an idea that was given scientific
credence by proponents such as Professor Raymond Dart and Dr. Konrad Lorenz, and suc-
cessfully popularized by Robert Ardrey.
The core of the aggression argument says that because we share a common heritage with the
animal kingdom we must possess and express an aggressive instinct. And the notion is elabo-
rated with the suggestion that at some point in our evolutionary history we gave up being
vegetarian ape-like creatures and became killers, with a taste not only for prey animals but
also for each other. It makes a good gripping story. More important, it absolves society from
attempting to rectify the evil in the world. But it is fiction-dangerous fiction.
Unquestionably we are part of the animal kingdom. And, yes, at some point in our evolution
we departed from the common dietary habits of the large primates and took to including a
significant amount of meat in our menu. But a serious biological interpretation of these facts
does not lead to the conclusion that, because once the whole of the human race indulged in
hunting as part of its way of life, killing is in our genes."
R. LEAKEY & R. LEWIN, ORIGINS 10 (1977).
For other approaches to the significance of cannibalism and flesh eating by humans, see E. JONES,
ON THE NIGHTMARE 131-53 (1951) (discussing werewolf myth; suggesting psychoanalytic relation
between "werewolves" and "outlaws," two words betraying etymological connections); P. READ,
ALIVE: THE STORY OF THE ANDES SUtVIVORS (1974) (best account of contemporary case of survival
cannibalism where, although no one was killed to be eaten, some of same symbolic questions were
raised concerning ingestion of human flesh); P. SOROKIN, HUNGER AS A FACTOR IN HUMAN AF-
FAIRS (1975) (among the best historical sociologies of hunger, including cannibalism; touches upon
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens). See also Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 616 (1949) (hypothetical about cannibalism and cave disaster).
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Ordinary Vices. By Judith N. Shklar.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. 268. $16.50.
Jean Bethke Elshtaint
Any new book by Judith Shklar, whose previous works include inter-
pretations of Rousseau's social theory1 and Hegel's political philosophy,2
as well as After Utopia8 and Legalism,4 merits attention. Her texts are
characterized by crisp, authoritative prose and a subdued erudition.
Shklar has very definite ideas on what others have said and the implica-
tions of their having said it. She never shirks from specifying what, in her
view, counts as decent or deadly politics. An unabashed celebrant of lib-
eral democracy, she views past thought and practice as well as present
possibility and peril from the standpoint of one secure in her own position
and certain in the knowledge that, while liberalism may not secure the
best of all possible worlds, it helps to guard against the worst.
Ordinary Vices5 is yet another affirmation of liberalism, this time
through an examination of "the sort of conduct we all expect, nothing
spectacular or unusual."6 In tribute to Montaigne, the "hero of this book"
whose "spirit" is on every page,7 Shklar begins her introduction with his
epigram: "Treachery, disloyalty, cruelty, tryanny . . . are our ordinary
vices."' Shklar quickly adapts the list to her purposes, dropping tyranny,
subsuming treachery and disloyalty into "betrayal," and adding hypocrisy,
snobbery, and misanthropy.
A discourse on vice presupposes the possibility of a discourse on virtue;
we cannot coherently look at one without some background notion of the
other. Vices are defects, corruptions, depravities. They are wicked or de-
grading in nature,9 and to mention them is to conjure up a picture of a
* John Cowles Professor of Government, Harvard University; MacArthur Fellow.
t Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
1. J. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS (1969).
2. J. SHKLAR, FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE (1976).
3. J. SHKLAR, AFTER UTOPIA (1957).
4. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
5. J. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1984) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
6. P. 1.
7. P. 1.
8. P. 1, quoting M. MONTAIGNE, Of Cannibals, reprinted in 1 THE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE,
202, 210 (E. Trechmann trans. 1927).
9. This is both everyday understanding and the dictionary definition, 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
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lapse, a falling away, or an active repudiation of an incorrupt, non-
depraved good or goodness. To rebuke someone for the vice of cruelty, for
example, is to acknowledge some alternative standard. "Non-cruelty," or
refraining from cruelty, is not itself a standard. It has meaning only by
reference to the prior endorsement of, for example, mercy or compassion
as qualities of character or performative imperatives. Shklar, however, of-
fers no explanation for the tacit framework that locates her vices-to the
extent they are vices-as primary. That each element in her list bears
"both personal and public dimensions""0 does not suffice to forge links
between and among them. The problems with Ordinary Vices begin at its
beginning, then, with Shklar's characterization of her project.
I.
Shklar fires a series of polemical volleys that signify her intent and her
method of proceeding. Various categories or traditions are dismissed,
pretty much out of hand, for having said nothing worthwhile about her
primary vice, cruelty. She claims, for example, that "theologians" in
general-and Christians in particular-have been virtually mute on the
vice of cruelty; moreover, Christianity historically did little to inhibit its
practice." In her view, theologians and other adherents of "revealed reli-
gion" are preoccupied with offenses against the divine order, and hence
incapable of doing any serious thinking about everyday problems."
"Philosophers," who constitue a second generic category, are indicted
for having "so little to say about cruelty."" This charge is not wholly
unjustified. In the name of analytic rigor, certain highly abstract philoso-
phers couch moral dilemmas in terms that distance human subjects from
the problem under consideration, creating often bizarre and trivial hypo-
thetical cases for our ostensible edification. Such analysis leads to exasper-
ated befuddlement.1 4 If these are the philosophers Shklar has in mind, her
rejection of philosophy is well taken.
Moral philosophy of the past several decades, however, offers many ex-
amples of a serious coming to grips with public and private dilemmas. I





13. Pp. 1, 7.
14. See, for example, Phillip Abbott's discussion of the treatment by analytic philosophers of
abortion. They framed the debate through hypotheticals involving spores filtering through window
screens, adults hooked up to violinists, and a whole plethora of arid abstractions all scrupulously
avoiding pictures of adult human beings cradling babies in their arms-or not. P. ABBOTr, THE
FAMILY ON TRIAL 133-46 (1981).
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Williams, Thomas Nagle, Sissela Bok, Stephen Toulmin, Philip Hallie,
Peter Singer, and others who, with Singer, have taken up the challenge to
do deep moral thinking about animals. Among political philosophers,
Alasdair Maclntyre, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer are important
for their inquiries into civic virtue and moral judgment in wars. Feminist
discourse too has challenged received understandings of public and private
vice. Shklar's sweeping dismissal of the philosophers is simply wrong.
Unlike theologians and philosophers, Shklar, following Montaigne, will
put cruelty first. Cruelty, she claims, "is often utterly intolerable for liber-
als, because fear destroys freedom"15 and because cruelty "puts us face to
face with our irrationality, as nothing else does."16 Freedom demands that
we put cruelty first. Granting that we all "have trouble grading the
vices,"' Shklar insists that we go ahead, although she admits that putting
cruelty first threatens reason and may result in our becoming "politically
disoriented and deeply confused."' 8 Still, once the wise man puts cruelty
first, he "will be careful" to control his misanthropy, "lest it becomes
rage.' 9
Evidently Shklar's schema-cruelty first, misanthropy second-is sup-
posed to alert the moral agent to facts that would otherwise be unavailable
for his or her scrutiny, enabling him or her to maintain moral equilib-
rium. Why this is so is uncertain, but it is certain that Shklar believes this
supposed illumination to be one of the central justifications for her project.
For example, she argues that if we put misanthropy first, we will have no
check against "our most destructive political possibilities."2 The result
could be anything from depression to a "political fury" bringing us "to
the point of mass murder."'" It is unclear what lies behind this rhetoric.
The McDonald's massacre indeed seems to have been perpetrated by a
misanthrope, but his rage was hardly political. And the mass murders
endemic to modern war cannot be understood by attributing misanthropic
motives to those who engineered them. Character flaws may account for
some deeds of violence, but the most enormous acts of violence are com-
mitted as a means toward the political ends of states. In this regard, a




18. P. 3. That we must rank the vices is open to dispute, despite Shklar's insistence that otherwise
we court confusion. Establishing a hard and fast ranking may move us towards an abstract universal-
ism that puts pressure on the very moral complexity she seeks to preserve. One might argue instead
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for example, fascism. The distance that separates a Scrooge's "Bah, hum-
bug!" from a calculatingly rationalized policy of engineered extermination
is too great to be bridged by a single "vice" as indeterminate and watery
as misanthropy.22
Given her ranking of vices, and in light of the alleged silence of theolo-
gians and philosophers on the topic, Shklar tells us at the outset that "we
must turn" to "historians, dramatists, and poets"23 for illumination. These
modes of discourse exemplify moral complexity, enabling us to recognize
the diversity of our own tradition and culture and thereby to sustain free-
dom. History and art fortify the defender of liberalism against its "clerical
and military critics" '24 who see in liberalism's essence "selfishness," judg-
ing it amoral as a result.25 Despite the charges of its critics, liberalism's
tolerance of diversity reveals "an enormous degree of self-control." 2
Although liberalism eschews coerced uniformity, it does impose a public
ethos-a form of self-control with public implications-that begins with
fear and thus with what is to be avoided. The liberal self is constituted
around a healthy core of fear and is thus braced for the "extremely diffi-
cult and constraining" 27 task of liberalism itself. Several questions suggest
themselves: How does the liberal self arise and how is "it" sustained? For
if the self that liberalism presupposes can be shown to be problematic, the
liberal project is jeopardized. Does a "liberalism of fear" constitute a pub-
lic ethos of "what is to be avoided" as securely as Shklar claims? Might
not fear, together with putting cruelty first, invite the solution of Hobbes'
Leviathan rather than a system of constraints and power balances that
work to keep open space for freedom?28
22. The misguided thinkers who give misanthropy pride of place are not the only ones Shklar
denounces. Those who put dishonesty or betrayal first, Shklar informs us, open up another Pandora's
box of unpleasant possibilities, for "then there is no built-in restraint upon fury, which did indeed
inspire unstable outbursts and violent misanthropy in the early modern period and again in the years
immediately after World War ." Pp. 3-4. Whose fury and what outbursts is not at all clear. In







28. See T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946) (1st ed. London 1651). Hobbes is the
greatest philosopher of fear in the English language. His omission from a book dedicated to a liber-
alism of fear is startling, for one of the things we need to understand, if we are to accept Shklar's
argument, is how we sustain just the right amount of fear, no more and no less. By showing us where
endemic-indeed ontological-fear takes us, Hobbes offers a benchmark for all subsequent discussions
of a politics of fear.
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II.
In search of answers to these questions, I shall follow Shklar's weight-
ing by concentrating upon "Putting Cruelty First." Shklar repeats the
charge made in her introductory comments that to "hate cruelty more
than any other evil involves a radical rejection of both religious and politi-
cal conventions."29 Religion focuses on the divine; Christians are con-
cerned with sins, with offenses against God. But "cruelty-the willful in-
flicting of physical pain on a weaker being in order to cause anguish and
fear-is a wrong done entirely to another creature."3 0
Montaigne provides Shklar's map to the moral terrain. In his attack on
Machiavelli in the Essays, Montaigne reinforces "his conviction that
Christianity had done nothing to inhibit cruelty." 13 ' Although the cruelty
Machiavelli endorses as necessary for his prince is at odds with Christian
morality, Shklar sees Montaigne digging deeper and finding in Machia-
vellian discourse glaring evidence of the inability of Christianity to pre-
vent celebrations of cruelty. In a strange twist to the tale, Machiavelli's
attack on Christian morality in politics becomes additional proof that
Christianity is a failure. If one adds to Montaigne's insights a considera-
tion of the brutal conduct of the Spaniards in the New World31 (not to
mention the Inquisition), Christianity's alleged indifference to cruelty
seems manifest.
This is a curious argument. I will not linger over whether Machiavelli
and Montaigne meant the same thing by cruelty. Shklar's mode of reason-
ing is more interesting: If some act or advocacy of wretched behavior oc-
curs subsequent to the enunciation of a standard at odds with that behav-
ior, it follows that the prior standard was ineffectual. If this were the case,
all expressions of moral ideals could be condemned as futile, for one could
always point to an action or expression that violated the ideals in ques-
tion. 3 This argument leads to absurd conclusions. That many centuries
elapsed from the time that an inclusive definition of humanity was articu-
lated until slavery was finally abolished in the Western world is no indict-
ment of the ideal. It is, instead, an indication of the intractability of one
form of institutionalized cruelty. The more interesting question is whether
29. P. 8.
30. P. 8 (emphasis in original).
31. P. 11.
32. Pp. 11-12.
33. My formulation here does not offer a knock-down argument against Shklar, for I must go on
to consider, as I cannot in this review, the matter of widespread violation of ostensibly deeply-held
standards. This is a complex matter, requiring nuanced consideration of history, moral philosophy,
and ordinary language.
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slavery would ever have been abolished had it not first been morally
problematized by the ideal of ontological equality. 4
Still, Montaigne and Shklar have a point. Cruelty in the name of
Christ is especially reprehensible because Christianity is a religion that
blesses the merciful and the peacemakers; that locates "forgiveness" as a
central virtue; that worships a prince of peace. Hannah Arendt discussed
the political importance of "the role of forgiveness in the realm of human
affairs."3 " Arendt saw in Jesus' "radical" formulation the deepest possibil-
ity for a new beginning by ending some repetitive and often destructive
pattern, breaking cycles of vengeance that enclose "both doer and sufferer
in the relentless automatism of the action process." 6 Forgiveness promises
freedom, and it must be taken seriously "in a strictly secular sense."
'37
Cruelty, particularly Christian cruelty, prevents the promise from being
fulfilled.
In her zeal to indict, however, Shklar distorts the historic record; not all
was cruelty. Christians in late antiquity expressed horror and disgust at
what they considered a culture of cruelty. Indeed, it was Christian revul-
sion that finally put an end to the unspeakable cruelty of the Roman
games in which human beings and animals were slaughtered and tortured
in elaborately staged bloodbaths for the entertainment of crowds. Church
councils preached against the widespread practice of infanticide and aban-
donment of infants, especially girls, and pressured the fourth century im-
perial state to end the practice. Christians downgraded the social status of
warriors and required that those who reverted to soldiering do penance.
38
Inaccuracy aside, Shklar's vision is unduly circumscribed. Her determi-
nation to avoid theological discourse leads to brief, unsatisfactory asides on
Augustine and Aquinas. She claims that Augustine was preoccupied with
"cupidity," not cruelty.39 But in the Augustinian metaphysic the vices co-
here-cruelty is internally linked to cupiditas, a fundamental orientation
that invites and rationalizes a whole range of vices. Augustine indicts a
"lust for domination" that "brings great evils to vex," from imperialist
34, It is not the case that the discourse of "sin" forces disconcern with cruelty. "Sins Crying to
Heaven for Vengeance" in traditional Catholic teaching, for example, are willful murder, sodomy,
oppression of the poor, and dishonesty in wage payments to workers. Each involves a social relation-
ship; each implicates the doer in a deed committed against another; each either involves cruelty by
definition or may invite cruelty.
35. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 236-43 (1958).
36, Id. at 241.
37. Id. at 238. It is this freedom from vengeance, from the perpetuation of cruelty, whether pri-
vate or public, of which religious thinkers opposed to the death penalty speak when they call for the
"cycle of cruelty" to be broken.
38. See, e.g., P. BROWN, THE CULT OF THE SAINTS (1981); P. DRONKE, WOMEN WRITERS OF
THE MIDDLE AGES (1984); M. MILES, FULLNESS OF LIFE (1981); 1 E. TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL
TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES (1931).
39. Pp. 7, 240-41.
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conquest to gladiatorial combat.4" To see a disregard of cruelty in condem-
nations of massacres, rapes, the razing of towns, and the loss of life of
combatants and civilians alike is inexplicable. Or, to proclaim that "many
Christians" who, although believing in sin, wish that Augustine "had
talked a bit less about sex and a lot more about hypocrisy," ' is a weak
reed with which to support such a blanket indictment. Perpetuating our
rather smug stereotypes concerning Augustine's supposed sex obsession ig-
nores his struggles with domination of the self by a force that may compel
the self to use others instrumentally. He did not preach loathing of the
body-indeed he did the opposite-but instead sought to free the body
from a domination that invites cruelty.42
Augustine anticipated Freud's declaration that the "history of human
civilization shows beyond any doubt that there is an intimate connection
between cruelty and the sexual instinct" and that this impulse to cruelty,
unless chastened by the emergence of a later "barrier of pity brings with it
a danger that the connection between the cruel and erotogenic instincts
...may prove unbreakable in later life."' 43 This fusion of cruelty and
sexuality, which manifests itself in private and public ways, in the brutali-
zation and abuse of sex partners, in assaults on children, in the sexualized
torture of prison inmates by other inmates or guards, is one of the most
common faces of cruelty as an "ordinary vice" in our time, and fully justi-
fies Augustine's concentration on cupiditas.
III.
If Shklar's genealogy of cruelty is flawed by its failure to take seriously
into account any pre-Montaigne discussions of the phenomenon, her case
additionally falters because she does not follow through on her most dra-
matic claims. Take, for example, her recognition that, overwhelmed by
cruelty, we may be driven to look for "positive qualities" in "those ulti-
mate victims of human cruelty, the animals. '44 Although she diminishes
somewhat the force of this formulation by calling both "plants and ani-
mals" our "chief victims" just one page later-though how a plant can be
a victim seems mysterious-this remains pretty strong stuff and invites
consideration of what the implications of such recognitions might be. In-
stead, Shklar veers away from our "ultimate victims" to a worry that
40. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 104 (D. Knowles ed. 1972).
41. P. 241.
42. See, for example, the discussions in Peter Brown's masterful biography, P. BROWN, AUGUS-
TINE OF Hippo 148-57 (1967) and in M. MILES, supra note 38, at 62-78.
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those who recognize this victimization may become extreme misanthropes.
This misanthropy may in turn lead us to overrate our victims,
whether-her list-animals, peasants, Jews, or children.
The idealization of the victim, which makes victimization something of
a sine qua non of virtue, and grants to the victimized a privileged position
in the moral universe, is indeed undignified and ultimately demeaning.
Additionally, Shklar reminds us, victimization invites fantasies of revenge.
The victimized, once they gain the upper hand, may turn into execution-
ers: "They are only waiting to change places . . . ."" We are warned of
the consequences of victimization through a brief exegesis of Sartre's claim
that the "victim can learn to respect himself only through violence," a
view that invites zealous cruelty. 6 Shklar concludes from all this that "no
history . . . can tell us how to think about victimhood."47 Surely this is
wrong, as a closer look at animal and human victimization demonstrates.
Even if human victims sometimes seek to victimize others in turn, the
same cannot be true for animal victims of human cruelty. In a recent film,
"Star Man," an interplanetary visitor asks his human companion why
men kill deer. "Do deer attack your species?" he queries. "No." "Well,
why then? To eat?" "Yes, I guess." "But deer do not eat humans?"
"No." "And there is other food?" "Yes." "A strange species," he con-
cludes, and his reference is not to the deer. The deer cannot turn on us;
nor can those monkeys confined to "primate chairs" in our laboratories.48
We may idealize them-surely some animal protectionists do-but they
cannot idealize themselves, nor turn their status as victim into a tool
against their oppressors. Thus our ultimate victims do not warrant the
skepticism Shklar advances in the case of human victims. Indeed, if one
believes animals to be our ultimate victims, it is unacceptably complacent
to fail to act in light of this recognition, or to fail to "review critically the
judgments we ordinarily make and the possibilities we usually see," the
task of political theory in Shklar's words.49
When we turn to human victimization, we also find ways to think
about victimhood that repudiate the seduction of vengeance. Locating mili-




48. See A. ROWAN, OF MICE, MODELS, AND MEN (1984). Electrodes are screwed into their
brains and they are tortured. Higher and higher levels of pain are administered until they die, victims
of unnecessary tests aimed at "measuring" how much pain can be tolerated before the animal perishes
from shock and trauma.
49. P. 226. See Singer, Ten Years of Animal Liberation, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Jan. 17, 1985, at
46-52 (review of ten new titles reflecting on cruelty to animals and human conduct). Just two other
titles from among a long list of possibilities are: M. MIDGLEY, ANIMALS AND WHY THEY MATTER
(1983), and J. TURNER, RECKONING WITH THE BEAST (1980).
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one extreme, and violent action against it at the other, Martin Luther
King proclaimed a route to self-respect for victims. Militant nonviolence,
he argued, enables the agent to "transmute hatred" in order to liberate
himself and his oppressor from the cycle of victim/victimizers. "Nonvi-
olence had tremendous psychological importance to the Negro," he wrote,
for it "vindicate[d] his dignity."50 Victims, Sartre notwithstanding, need
not become the new executioners. Perhaps this way of thinking and acting
about victimization falls out of Shklar's picture because it calls upon
moral identities and convictions her liberal psychology of fear cannot
capture.
Shklar draws a muted conclusion from her resounding insistence on
putting cruelty first. The consequences of this ordering of vices, she pro-
claims, have been "faced fully" only by Montaigne. "It makes political
action difficult beyond endurance, may cloud our judgment, and may re-
duce us to a debilitating misanthropy and even to moral cruelty. These
pitfalls can be avoided by skepticism and an isolating aloofness. This is
open to few of us . . ,,." Thinking about cruelty being so difficult to
endure, we become "just as evasive" as "our philosophic ancestors" and
deploy various dodges, referring instead to "sadism" or "aggression.
'52
We find ourselves in Montaigne's paradoxes and puzzlements and "talk
around cruelty because we do not want to talk about it."53
These remarks deflect from cruelty to comfort thinkers who put it first,
sympathizing with the difficulty of the task. But many are propelled by
their recognition of cruelty to act, not to evade. They manage to endure
the political imperatives that flow from a primary concern with cruelty.
What is "beyond endurance" is the cruelty they fight, whether torture of
helpless sentient creatures in the name of science; torture of humans in the
name of politics; or assaults on human dignity through systematic denial
of basic freedoms and justice.5
The questions only proliferate if we seek the consequences of putting




54. Shklar also rescues Jeremy Bentham, a prime mover in reform movements to limit cruelty,
from an unnamed enemy or school of thought. Pp. 35-37. Her reference is clearly to Michel Foucault
when she writes: "It is among the more grotesque intellectual misinterpretations that Bentham should
now occasionally be regarded as in some way a contributor to the terrors of contemporary dictator-
ship. His plan for improved prisons is now scorned as the model for future gulags and camps. This
libel, designed to discredit all critics of the traditional order, need not detain us." P. 35. But it should,
particularly if one cares about democracy. For Foucault's point is that Bentham's Panopticism, while
it may indeed limit physical cruelty, enhances possibilities for surveillance and an "indefinite disci-
pline." See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195-228 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977).
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cruelty first. What about the death penalty? What about animal experi-
mentation? What about ways to respond to domestic violence that pre-
serve some notion of a private sphere free from state intrusion? What
about the cruelty of poverty? What about cruelty to children: Must we
move in the direction of "children's liberation" or are there other options?
What about media violence and its effect upon the hearts and minds of
citizens, young and old? What about abortion and euthanasia? Shklar is
right not to tell us "what is to be done," but wrong to refuse to carry
through on the political implications of her own scale of vices.
IV.
Considerations of hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal, and misanthropy fol-
low. Though hypocrisy "remains the only unforgivable sin,"' 55 Shklar for-
gives it in the end because she finds antihypocrites so off-putting and be-
cause she repudiates "ideological discourse," which inevitably puts
hypocrisy first and skews our politics. In her view, "all ideologies" are
infected by a "basic hypocrisy" that invites the pretense that the "ideologi-
cal needs of the few correspond to the moral and material interests of the
many."' 6 Shklar's targets include "all politically active intellectuals, who
generally are also extreme antihypocrites. ' 57 The "all"-my emphasis-is
an undiluted indictment that ignores the many who do not fit her descrip-
tion. Albert Camus comes immediately to mind. 8
Hypocrisy, rather than cruelty, provides the framework for Shklar's
most sustained discussion of war. She sees discourse on war as a cycle of
repetitive charges of hypocrisy and counter-hypocrisy, or what she terms
the "normal process of recriminations." 59 Shklar deflates "just war dis-
course"-a tradition of reflecting and judging morally about justifications
and means of war. She claims that if "one puts cruelty first, one will
follow some version of Kant's doctrine and see war as beyond the rules of
good and evil, just and unjust." 60 It will be clear that "the very possibility
of justice" is extinguished in "the world of kill or be killed.""1 Locating
war beyond moral consideration gives it the status of a force majeure, on
a par with some natural disaster. It is unclear where this leaves the citizen
55. P. 45.
56. P. 66.
57. P. 66. (emphasis supplied).
58. Camus' work is that of the engaged political intellectual who repudiates ideological construc-
tions that blunt moral sensitivity and locate the intellectual in an elite status. See A. CAMUS, THE
REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT (A. Bower trans. 1956); A. CAMus, RESISTANCE, REBEL-
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of a liberal democracy seeking to locate herself with reference to the car-
nage of war and to find a language in which to discuss it.
6 2
Curiously, Shklar omits Hannah Arendt's insightful discussion of "[t]he
momentous role that hypocrisy and the passion for its unmasking came to
play in the later stages of the French Revolution.""6 According to Arendt,
it was "the war upon hypocrisy that transformed Robespierre's dictator-
ship into the Reign of Terror."'64 Exploring how it is that hypocrisy ("one
of the minor vices") came to be "hated more than all the other vices taken
together," Arendt located the assault upon hypocrisy inside a larger war
upon "society as the eighteenth century knew it," making of the Revolu-
tion the "explosion" of some uncorrupted core through the "outward shell
of decay." 5
Shklar's next target, snobbery, is a curious choice for a major vice, but
Shklar finds it both "very destructive" and "quite ineradicable." 6 Snob-
bery "habitually cause[s]" pain and rage and is "wholly out of place" in a
democratic society. 7 Her authorities are La Bruy~re, Moliere, Thackeray,
and Francis Grund. She anticipates the criticism that snobbery is small
potatoes in the overall scheme of things by conceding that imperialism,
racism, nativism and anti-Semitism are deeper issues; racism, in particu-
lar, being "far more significant than snobbery."6 Yet there is a "not irrel-
evant" connection between the two, for "two of Europe's main racist theo-
rists . . . were bogus counts." 9 Snobbery and racism, she concludes, are
"cousins."" 0 Primary snobbery, a remnant of aristocratic disdain and
bourgeois toadying, assaults democracy. But secondary snobbery, the com-
pulsion to form cliques and associate with one's own group to the partial
exclusion of others, is integral to freedom.
Shklar recalls the Students for a Democratic Society through the prism
of snobbery, bringing forward one of her few examples drawn from recent
political history. She credits SDS with creating a "less snobbish climate in
the universities," but accuses them of writing a "chapter in the political
history of both snobbery and the effort to eradicate it" and failing "on
both counts.""1 SDS' call for participatory democracy is reduced by Shklar
to anti-snobbery. The history of SDS becomes a tale in which activists
62. Cf. M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977) (discussing morality of war "from a
rights-oriented just war perspective").
63. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 98 (1963).
64. Id. at 99.
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"from the top of society" go to "the bottom" and are rejected. Guilty of
noblesse oblige, which has "no place in a democracy," SDS was doomed
at the outset.72 Not only is this story of SDS a partial construction that
turns a complex story of external and internal pressures into a foreor-
dained morality play, but the claim that noblesse oblige has no place in a
democracy is wrong. It ignores the roles such motivation has played his-
torically in calling attention to social conditions and promoting reforms
that enhanced the democratic features of American society. What starts as
noblesse oblige may be transformed, through political action, into a genu-
inely democratic identification with the suffering of others and a determi-
nation to put an end to it. The career of Eleanor Roosevelt is exemplary
in this regard.
73
On to betrayal, the "main theme of our literature and history."'7 4 Shklar
begins by reminding us of the obvious-that there can be "genuine con-
flicts of loyalty."'7 5 Examples are drawn from Shakespeare, Henry James,
Louis Auchincloss, Frank Norris, William Faulkner, William Dean
Howell, Evelyn Waugh, and the film "Casablanca." Shklar is irked by E.
M. Forster's proclamation of personal love and loyalty against the claims
of the state, in which he declares that were he forced to choose between
betraying his country and betraying his friend, "I hope I should have the
guts to betray my country. 7M For Shklar this is "not an intelligent state-
ment" because Forster failed to specify "the kind of 'state' involved or
how one's friends might betray it."7 7 He did not, for example, recognize
the differences between "decent" legal systems, the United States and
Great Britain, which did not force such choices, and the Soviet Union and
Nazi Germany, which did. In a statement that comes off as unintendedly
smug, Shklar notes: "For quite apart from how one chooses, the most
important political and personal aim must always be to live under laws
that do not force us to make intolerable choices. Parents and children
should simply not be put into such situations. '7 8 Well, perhaps not, but
many are and have been. Montesquieu's Enlightenment conviction, that
"only the claims of humanity as a whole should count, '7 is not much help
in traversing this moral terrain, nor are Shklar's segu~s into Montaigne
72. P. 134.
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on friendship, Shakespeare's Richard II, Marlowe's Jew of Malta, Ra-
cine's Britannicus, and so on.
Shklar's most interesting claim in her chapter on betrayal is that "it is
in republics . . . that treason and subversion are most thoroughly de-
spised" because "a Lockean political society depends on trust more than
any other."'8 0 Our obsession with subversion, which she locates in "the
very structure of politics in a representative democracy,"'" invites excessive
fears of betrayal that can themselves subvert order. This insight warrants
a more complete discussion than she provides.
Misanthropy, Shklar's final vice, can "initiate slaughters,"8 2 but need
not. She identifies three main types of misanthropic characters, endorsing
a "calm misanthropy," which "became the basis of constitutional govern-
ment, especially in America.""3 "That was one of Montesquieu's many
contributions to politics" and represents misanthropy's "finest hour.""'
Once again, a complex constellation of historic events and ideas is
squeezed into a narrow frame that purports to be the whole story. We
gain little by describing mistrust of concentrations of power as misan-
thropy. Why not "realism" or "pessimism"? The dictionary is clear: Mis-
anthropy is "hatred" of mankind. Jefferson was no hater. To call skepti-
cism about human perfectibility or goodness misanthropy skews the
discussion in a direction most compatible with Shklar's insistence that a
liberalism of fear is "the whole basis" of liberalism itself. This may ex-
plain, but it cannot justify, Shklar's interpretation.
V.
Shklar's final chapter, "Bad characters for good liberals," has all the
earmarks of an afterthought. She restates that she has neither moved to-
wards a goal nor linked chapters by a continuous argument, declaring it
the job of political theory "to make our conversations and convictions
about our society more complete and coherent and to review critically the
judgments we ordinarily make and the possibilities we usually see.""5 Her
"we" here refers to people who are "familiar with the political prac-
tices"'86 of liberal society, who have a certain sort of education, and who
take the institutions of constitutional government as a political given.
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events,""7 of being more concrete than conceptual analysis and model
building allow. We must "look to literature" to find the "essence" of the
vices.88 But looking to literature, and storytelling, are more complex activi-
ties than Shklar acknowledges. Storytelling of the sort Shklar endorses
involves a prior commitment to a narrative structure that presumes a
guiding telos, an endpoint. Additionally, Shklar endorses implicitly a the-
ory of mimesis whereby literary representations reveal the "real" to itself.
But her many examples, as interesting and lively as they often are, fail to
locate the reader inside a complex social world that includes concrete po-
litical dilemmas; rather, one finds oneself constantly tugged away from a
potential debate Shklar touches upon-for example, cruelty to ani-
mals-into yet another excursus.
She moves to bolster the shaky architecture of Ordinary Vices in her
final few pages by calling upon Kantian "moral fortitude," endorsing a
collective stiffening of spines.8 ' Liberalism, after all, is no project for the
faint hearted. This apparent endorsement of Kantian formulations and the
Kantian moral inheritance tout de suite begs more questions than it an-
swers. To assert that a "deeper connection between personal character
and liberal government than one might guess"9 exists, and that this con-
nection lies in government "keeping its hands off our characters"9 " by pro-
viding a framework that itself presupposes no substantive moral ends, fails
to demonstrate how such a connection is forged and sustained. Shklar
seems to presume that features of American culture other than liberal con-
stitutionalism do not form our characters in an important way, ignoring,
for example, the importunate intrusions of consumerism, the continued
force of family, religious, and ethnic ties, the nature of work-life, and the
changing face of male-female relations.
The Kantian subject, whose spiritual inner core and deepest impulses
lie outside the scope of public authorities and fellow citizens, is a bracing
artifact of a powerful discursive tradition. This notion of self as a rational
being prior to and independent of his or her objects and any particular
experiences gives way as the subject is severed from his or her situation
and projects.9 2 Shklar fails to confront the strongest critics of her position;






92. For an elegant critique of a Kantian derived deontological liberalism, see M. SANDEL, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). From a very different angle, Hannah Arendt argues
controversially that Adolph Eichmann adhered closely to a popularized understanding of the require-
ments of Kant's categorical imperative and to Kant's precept that "a law . [is] a law." H. AR-
ENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 135-37 (rev. ed. 1964).
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at all."3 Yet, even within Shklar's own schema, Kant's insistence that man
owes it "to himself to avoid wanton acts of cruelty to animals," '94 is thin
gruel if one puts cruelty first. A morality that presumes rational consent
between self-interested, contracting parties who are equals, necessarily re-
stricts the range of our moral consideration.95
Shklar describes Ordinary Vices as "a ramble through a moral
minefield, not a march toward a destination."9 6 This is an odd choice of
words. One doesn't "ramble" through a minefield. One moves with pur-
posive caution, for a single careless misstep may prove fatal. One rambles
only after the minefield has been swept and transformed into safe terrain.
Shklar's choice of vices and examples, her refusal to press hard cases, to
draw out the political implications of her own claims, or to take strong
criticisms into account, suggests that a more apt metaphor would be a
stroll through a garden where vices, like weeds, sometimes erupt but are
kept under control by a vigilant gardener. The order and stability of the
whole are quite unspoiled. Unfortunately, the world is more like a
minefield than a garden.
93. Women, for example, are a problem for Kant's moral project, being more imbedded, in his
view, in the embodied and the "immediate." See Blum, Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A
Feminist Perspective, 12 CAN. J. PHIL. 287 (1982); Elshtain, Kant, Politics, and Persons: The Impli-
cations of His Moral Philosophy, 14 PoLITY 205 (1981).
94. P. 233.
95. M. MIDGLEY, supra note 49, at 51. To be sure, Kant wants us to behave responsibly toward
animals, but they are not self conscious; they exist merely as a means to an end. That end is man.
96. P. 6.
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Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution: A Belated Review
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. By Joseph
Story. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. and Cambridge: Brown,
Shattuck & Co., 1833. Vol. I: Pp. xxxiv, 494. Vol. II: Pp. 555. Vol.
III: Pp. 776.
H. Jefferson Powell*
Over a century and a half have passed since the publication of Justice
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution,' the most massive and
most widely discussed treatise on constitutional law in pre-Civil War
America.2 In their day, the Commentaries were both praised as an "in-
comparable monument of sound and healthy and incontestable constitu-
tional principles,"3 and damned as a "regrett[able]" collection of "mere
dogmas" lacking support in history or principle.4 The specific political
and constitutional struggles to which the Commentaries made an impor-
tant intellectual contribution have long since been resolved, and the trea-
tise itself has faded from the consciousness of constitutional lawyers. Nev-
ertheless, Joseph Story's central historical role as scholar and judge in the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. The original draft of this review was written
while I was a Research Associate at the Yale Law School; I appreciate the school's support. I am
greatly indebted to Eric Andersen, Owen Fiss, Burke Marshall, Walter Pratt, and George Priest for
their comments, criticisms, and encouragement.
1. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston & Cam-
bridge 1833) [hereinafter referred to as Commentaries; cited by volume and page number only].
2. See W. SWINDLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL 18 (1978). The
Commentaries were a major, if unacknowledged, source of Alexis de Tocqueville's classic Democracy
in America (Paris 1835). See E. BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1790-1860, at
356-57 (1952).
3. Letter from James Kent to Joseph Story (June 19, 1833), reprinted in 2 J. STORY, LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 135 (W. Story ed. Boston 1851) [hereinafter cited as LIFE]. Story's
colleague and mentor on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall, described the Commen-
taries as a "great work" and a "comprehensive and an accurate commentary on our Constitution,
formed in the spirit of the original text." Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 31, 1833),
reprinted in 2 LIFE, supra, at 135.
4. A. UPSHUR, A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF OUR FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 53 (Petersburg 1840). Upshur's 132 page "brief enquiry" was a critical review of the
Commentaries setting forth a states' rights interpretation of the Constitution. The preeminent states'
rights theorist John C. Calhoun offered an even harsher evaluation of Story's treatise: "I regard
Story's Commentaries as essentially false and dangerous." Letter from John Calhoun to A.D. Wallace
(Dec. 17, 1840), in 15 J. CALHOUN, THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 389 (C. Wilson ed. 1983).
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development of American law was recognized from an early date. Nine-
teenth-century states' rights theorists perceived in the Commentaries the
antebellum era's most substantial intellectual challenge to their views; 5 in-
deed, Alexander H. Stephens credited Story with virtually creating ex
nihilo the nationalist constitutionalism that legitimized Abraham Lin-
coln's successful war against secession.' Students of American thought
have long recognized Story's importance as a creator and prime exemplar
of the American legal mind,7 and Story's place on the pages of legal his-
tory proper has been prominent.' In recent years, Professor Morton Hor-
witz has identified Story as a key actor in "the transformation of Ameri-
can law" between 1780 and 1860,' while Professor James McClellan has
portrayed Story as, even more than John Marshall, the author of the po-
litical and constitutional system of the modern United States.' 0
What is perhaps most striking about the commentary on Story's contri-
bution to American law is its essential uniformity. Despite a chronological
spread of a century and a half, despite an ideological range from Confed-
erate apologist to critical legal scholar, the interpretations have remained
nearly constant.1 For example, notwithstanding the yawning gap between
their normative evaluations of Story's role, Horwitz and McClellan agree
5. Upshur regarded the commentaries of Story and Kent as holding the "first rank" among those
published since The Federalist, but considered only Story's work important enough to merit refuta-
tion. A. UPSHUR, supra note 4, at 6. Henry St. George Tucker's states' rights lectures also chose the
Commentaries as a target. See H. TUCKER, LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Richmond 1843);
E. BAUER, supra note 2, at 205. Alexander Stephens dismissed Chancellor Kent with the remark that
Kent "goes into no argument. He barely deals . . . in assertion." 1 A. STEPHENS, A CONSTITU-
TIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 505 (Philadelphia 1868). Stephens, finding
Story a more formidable opponent, went to greater length in refuting the Commentaries. See id. at
59-81, 117-70, 498-522. Jefferson Davis also found it necessary to attack Story. 1 J. DAVIS, THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 114-15, 129-34, 141-45 (1881).
6. Stephens claimed that no respectable jurist had argued for a nationalist reading of the Constitu-
tion before Kent's treatise in 1826 and Story's in 1833, 1 A. STEPHENS, supra note 5, at 505, and
discounted Kent's short discussion as mere "assertion." For Stephens, it was Story who had given
nationalism intellectual plausibility. See supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 124-25, 136-39, 141-42 (1965); 2
V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTION IN
AMERICA 300-03 (1927).
8. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 119, 288-90 (1973); H. HYMAN &
W. WIECEK, EqUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 18-19, 57-61 (1982); G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDI-
CIAL TRADITION 35-63 (1976). None of these recent works shares in the old practice of regarding
Story as a schoolmasterish and even faintly ludicrous disciple of John Marshall. That view is reflected
in the well-known, although probably apocryphal, account of Marshall stating a holding and then
saying, "Now Story, that is the law; you find the precedents for it." J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 307 & n.149 (1971) (quoting alternative versions).
9. See M. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 255-56 (1977).
10. See J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 8, at 305-09. For a critique of McClellan's book, see Hor-
witz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
275 (1973).
11. Vernon Parrington's remarks about James Kent vividly summarize this consensus view of
Story: "Like John Marshall and Joseph Story he was expert in devising legal springes to catch un-
wary democrats, and while the Jeffersonians were shouting over their victories at the polls, he was
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in categorizing Story as an opponent of "democracy" intent on frustrating
the results of the political process. He sought to accomplish this goal, they
argue, by the creation of a body of "anti-majoritarian" constitutional law'2
biased in favor of the capitalist entrepreneur at the expense of agrarian
and labor interests. This consensus interpretation presupposes that the im-
pact of Story's work on the distribution of political and economic power in
America "explains" his thought. What such an approach intentionally de-
preciates is the significance and meaning of Story's thought viewed as an
intellectual construct.
The purpose of this review is not to quarrel with the legitimacy of
political and economic analysis in legal history, but rather to argue for the
value of a complementary approach: the re-presentation of a text, in this
case Story's constitutional treatise, "as it bore meaning in the mind of the
author." ' There are, of course, certain perspectives from which such an
enterprise seems pointless, most notably the vulgar derivations of Marx-
ism that see all language and all thought as camouflage for the assertion
of class interest. But economic reductionism is unacceptable as an exclu-
sive interpretive methodology because it ignores the compelling sociologi-
cal view that intellectual forms and concepts "are part of the reality they
order, that language is part of the social structure and not epiphenomenal
to it.'
14
This "belated review" of Story's Commentaries approaches Story in his
self-proclaimed role as constitutional thinker. It thus seeks to recapture
Story's presentation of his constitutional vision "from within," as that vi-
sion appeared to the man himself. This does not involve divorcing Story's
words from their historical setting-far from it-for an examination of
that setting is essential to understanding the meaning and purposes of the
Commentaries. But this approach does require us to take seriously Story's
engaged in the strategic work of placing the Constitution under the narrow custodianship of the Eng-
lish law." 2 V. PARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 197-98. See also H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESI-
DENTS 81 (1974) (Story "neither a democrat nor a confirmed majoritarian"); G. WHITE, supra note
8, at 39, 47 (1976) (Story's judicial doctrines concerned with protecting propertied classes against
broadening of political power).
12. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 9, at 255-56 (Story's public law opinions dominated by con-
servative fear that legislatures might invade private property rights); J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 8, at
269-70 (Story's opinions represent attempt to erect "unsurmountable barrier" against democratic en-
croachment on private property rights and liberties).
13. J. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 6 (1971). See also id. at 9 ("historical explana-
tion" of a text seeks "what the author meant to say").
14. J. POCOCK, supra note 13, at 38. See also Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67
MINN. L. REV. 645, 691-97 (1983) (economic approach to history, while valuable, cannot explain all
aspects of legal change). Sophisticated Marxists have not disagreed. See, e.g., Letter from Friedrich
Engels to Joseph Bloch (Sept. 21-22, 1890), in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS & PHILOSOPHY:
KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS 397-98 (L. Feuer ed. 1959) (neither Marx nor Engels ever
claimed that forms of thought including "political, juristic, philosophical theories" do not exert influ-
ence on historical development).
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arguments as arguments, and not just as means toward some political or
social end. The results of this attempt to restate Story's constitutionalism
draw into question the consensus interpretation of Story, for the Constitu-
tion which Story depicted in the Commentaries was not an immutable
barrier against popular rule but rather a flexible instrument guided by the
dictates of republican and majoritarian rule.
I. THE SETTING OF THE Commentaries
Legal education in the United States during the late 1820's was largely
pursued in non-academic settings. The famous law school founded by
Tapping Reeve in Litchfield, Connecticut was in decline and would fi-
nally close its doors in 1833."5 Other legal academies proved ephemeral."8
Although chairs of law existed at several colleges, these professorships had
failed to constitute the nuclei of enduring programs of instruction.17 Many
Americans rejoiced in the Republic's apparent freedom from a complex
and esoteric body of law taught and administered by professional law-
yers. 8 Leading members of the bench and bar, however, believed the crea-
tion of regular institutions of legal training an essential part of their cam-
paign to professionalize-and restrict-the practice of law. 9 Writing in
1817, Joseph Story labelled it a "common delusion, that the law may be
thoroughly acquired in the immethodical, interrupted, and desultory stud-
ies . . . of a practising counsellor." He therefore hailed "the importance,
nay, the necessity, of the law-school" that Harvard College had recently
created with the establishment of the Royall chair of law."0
Despite the founding of the Royall professorship, legal education at
Harvard remained in a "near-moribund" state over a decade later."'
Much of the credit for establishing the Harvard Law School as a perma-
nent institution must be given to Nathan Dane, a distinguished figure in
Massachusetts legal and political life.22 Dane's penultimate contribution to
the legal profession was his General Abridgment and Digest of American
15. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 279.
16. Id. at 279-80.
17. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 4-5, 8 (1983).
18. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 265-66; P. MILLER, supra note 7, at 99-116.
19. P. MILLER, supra note 7, at 109-16.
20. J. STORY, Course of Legal Study, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 66,
91-92 (W. Story ed. 1851) [hereinafter cited as WRITINGS].
21. G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 284-85
(1970).
22. A delegate to the Confederation Congress in the 1780's, Dane was the primary author of the
famous Northwest Ordinance of 1787. He served afterwards in the Massachusetts General Court and
on several state law reform commissions. Although a participant in the Hartford Convention of 1815,
convened by New England Federalists opposed to the war measures of the Republican administration,
Dane proved a staunch nationalist during the nullification crisis of 1828-33. For a biographical
sketch of Dane's career, see E. BAUER, supra note 2, at 124-32.
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Law."3 A vast compilation of legal materials that enjoyed great popularity
with the bar, the General Abridgment was modelled after the widely used
eighteenth-century English abridgment of Charles Viner. Viner had en-
dowed the first chair of common law at Oxford from the royalties of his
book,24 and when the General Abridgment proved financially successful,
Dane imitated Viner by offering Harvard ten thousand dollars out of its
receipts to establish a chair of law.
Dane's offer specified that the professor should deliver and revise for
publication lectures on a number of subjects, including "Federal Law and
Federal Equity." Dane further specified Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story as the first incumbent of the position, "if he will accept the office."25
Although Story had previously refused Harvard's Royall chair, he eventu-
ally agreed to accept the new professorship, and on August 25, 1829,
Story was installed as the first Dane Professor of Law."
Dane's selection of Story was due in large part to the two Massachu-
setts natives' shared concern for legal learning.17 The young Story, fresh
from his undergraduate years at Harvard where he devoted himself to
belles-lettres, had been dismayed at first by "the intricate, crabbed and
obsolete learning"2 he encountered in studying the law. Once in practice,
however, Story quickly established himself as a skilled legal technician;
his research into the more recondite details of legal lore became a cher-
ished avocation as well as a means to professional advancement. 9
Story's ability as a practitioner allayed much of the original hostility
which he encountered from the overwhelmingly Federalist Massachusetts
bar because of his Republican political opinions. At the time of his admis-
sion Story was, he later wrote, the only lawyer in Essex County "who
23. Dane began work on the General Abridgment in the 1780's, and finally published the eight
volume work in 1823-24. A ninth supplementary volume came out in 1829. E. BAUER, supra note 2,
at 129.
24. The first Vinerian Professor was William Blackstone. Story admired Blackstone's Commenta-
ries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) and, in writing his own Commentaries, he adopted the
treatise form used by Blackstone.
25. Letter from Nathan Dane to the President and Fellows of Harvard University (June 2,
1829), reprinted in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 3-6. Dane stipulated that the incumbent should not be
required to reside in Cambridge so that Story could accept the post while remaining on the Supreme
Court.
26. 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 6-7.
27. See Letter from Nathan Dane, supra note 25, at 5 (Story qualified to teach both "by study
and practice").
28. J. STORY, Autobiography (1831), in 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at 73.
29. A year after being admitted to the bar Story anonymously published a collection of judicial
decisions entitled American Precedents of Declarations (1802); in 1805 a handbook of Pleadings in
Civil Actions came out under his own name. From 1809 to 1811 Story prepared American editions of
three standard legal texts, Chitty's Bills and Notes, Abbott's Ships and Shipping, and Lawe's As-
sumpsit. See G. DUNNE, supra note 21, at 40-41, 74.
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was either openly or secretly a democrat."3 Despite his youth, Story rap-
idly became one of the most prominent Republicans in Massachusetts and
in May 1808 he was elected to serve out the unexpired term of a deceased
Republican congressman. Story's short period of service in Washington
(December 1808-February 1809) was dominated by controversy over the
Jefferson administration's conduct of foreign policy. In retaliation for Eu-
ropean violations of neutral rights, the administration had obtained from
Congress an act embargoing trade with the belligerents. The embargo
crippled New England's sea-faring economy, and the Federalist regional
majority in Congress countenanced evasion of and even direct resistance to
the act. Although deeply concerned about the embargo's impact on the
region's commerce, 1 Story recognized that the administration was acting
in good faith in a difficult situation, and he denounced the "deeply crimi-
nal" Federalist resistance to the embargo. 2 Congressman Story nonethe-
less became convinced that continuance of the embargo would seriously
threaten the integrity of the Union. He therefore took an active role in
securing an end to the embargo, 3 and in the process irretrievably alien-
ated President Jefferson. 4 After his single congressional session, Story
served in the lower house of the state legislature (as speaker for almost a
year) 5 and continued his private legal practice, representing the successful
party in the reargument before the Supreme Court of the great case of
Fletcher v. Peck. 6
The death of United States Supreme Court Justice William Cushing in
September 1810 led to Story's return to Washington. President James
Madison wished to choose a successor to Cushing, a Massachusetts native,
from the small group of New England Republican lawyers, but he exper-
ienced considerable difficulty doing so. Madison's first nominee refused to
serve for health reasons, and his second was rejected by the Senate; his
third choice, John Quincy Adams, preferred to remain at his diplomatic
post in Europe. Over Jefferson's private but vehement objections,
Madison turned to Joseph Story. 7
Story brought to his judicial duties a delight in legal learning and a
30. 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at 95.
31. See e.g., Letter from Joseph Story to William Fettyplace (Feb. 28, 1808), in 1 LIFE, supra
note 3, at 165-66.
32. Letter from Joseph Story to Joseph White (Dec. 31, 1808), in 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at
172-73.
33. See Letter from Joseph Story to Joseph White (Jan. 4, 1809), in 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at
174-75; Letter from Joseph Story to William Fettyplace (Jan. 14, 1809), in 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at
175-83; G. DUNNE, supra note 21, at 60-69.
34. E. BAUER, supra note 2, at 138.
35. See 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at 194-200.
36 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
37. See G. DUNNE, supra note 21, at 77-82.
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belief in the necessity of a unified nation with a strong central govern-
ment. As a circuit justice, he played a key role in the growth of early
nineteenth-century admiralty and commercial law. On the Supreme
Court, Story's most notable performance prior to his appointment to the
Dane Professorship was his opinion for the Court in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee," which vigorously asserted the supremacy of the federal govern-
ment and specifically upheld the Court's authority to review state court
decisions on federal questions. Story's nationalism, like his erudition, com-
mended him to Dane.
Professor Story proved to be an extremely popular teacher, and his ef-
forts and prestige were a major factor in the Harvard Law School's flour-
ishing state during the sixteen years that he served as Dane Professor. 9
Equally important to the growth of a legal academic tradition and to the
professionalization of American law were his scholarly labors, undertaken
in obedience to the terms of Dane's gift.4 Between 1832 and 1845, Story
published nine lengthy treatises and secured a world-wide reputation as a
legal scholar."1 After sending his first treatise, on bailments, to the pub-
lishers in the middle of 1831, Story began work on a commentary on the
United States Constitution.42 Story completed the Commentaries in the
latter part of 1832, and prepared an abridged one volume textbook edition
while the unabridged three volumes were in press. The unabridged ver-
sion appeared in January 1833 and the textbook in April."3 Although
Story considered preparing a second edition of the unabridged version, he
never did so, and the January 1833 text was to remain his chief extrajudi-
cial contribution to American constitutional law.
The picture of the Commentaries' origins painted above is a familiar
and peaceful one-distinguished lawyer and judge becomes professor, ded-
icating himself to instruction and scholarship. But it is only a partial truth
at best. The Commentaries were not simply the product of an academic's
tranquil reflections; they were, even more, Story's response to what he
saw as attacks on his personal integrity and threats to his nation's public
order.
38. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
39. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 281.
40. Because Story's teaching style was "by familiar and conversational expositions, and not by
written lectures," he elected to write a series of "systematic treatises" on the subjects designated by
Dane rather than to publish his lectures. 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 69.
41. The series eventually included Bailments (Cambridge 1832), the Commentaries, Conflict of
Laws (Boston 1834), Equity Jurisprudence (Boston 1836), Equity Pleadings (Boston 1838), Agency
(Boston 1839), Partnership (Boston 1841), Bills of Exchange (Boston 1843), and Promissory Notes
(Boston 1845). See also 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 648-65 (collecting favorable reviews, many of them
from British and European publications).
42. 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 69.
43. See id. at 129-30.
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The threats derived from the nullification crisis of 1828-1833."' The
roots of the crisis lay deep in the history and character of America, but its
immediate cause was an 1828 protective tariff intended to foster domestic,
primarily Northern, manufacturing industries. Labelled the "tariff of
abominations" by its primarily Southern opponents, the act provoked a
storm of protests claiming that it was both unjust and unconstitutional. 
5
The attack on the tariff took its most extreme, and most official, form in
South Carolina. In December 1828, the state legislature approved a report
that became known as the South Carolina Exposition."' The Exposition,
invoking the authority of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798
and 1799,47 asserted the right of each state to judge for itself the constitu-
tionality of federal actions affecting the state's interests, and to interpose
its sovereign authority to prevent enforcement of federal measures that in
its view were unauthorized by the constitutional compact."' The crisis did
not abate with the inauguration of the supposed states' rights candidate
for President, Andrew Jackson, and after it became evident in early 1830
that Jackson would uphold federal authority in the matter, Vice President
Calhoun openly assumed the leadership of the anti-tariff forces. The crisis
came to the edge of violence in November 1832, when a South Carolina
state convention passed an ordinance purporting to nullify the tariff.'
44. The serious nature of this affair was recognized by contemporaries. For example, in a series
of resolutions adopted on January 12, 1833, the Alabama General Assembly called on South Carolina
to renounce nullification and Congress to repeal the tariff in order to end "this fearful crisis." The
assembly declared that the "alarming attitude" of South Carolina and the "obnoxious duties" imposed
by Congress were threatening to "peril the union of these States, and make shipwreck of the last hope
of mankind." STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 180-81 (H. Ames ed. 1906) [hereinafter
cited as STATE DOCUMENTS].
45. Id. at 152. See also id. at 152-89 (collecting state papers).
46. 6 J. CALHOUN, WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 1 (R. CrallE ed. New York 1855). The
Exposition was drafted secretly by Vice President Calhoun, a fact widely known by the time Story
wrote the Commentaries. See II: 431 n.1.
47. South Carolina Exposition (adopted Dec. 1828), reprinted in J. CALHOUN, supra note 46, at
43-44. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, drafted by James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson respectively, were adopted by those states as a formal protest against the Alien and Sedition
Acts. The Jeffersonian Republicans regarded these acts as unconstitutional measures designed by the
dominant Federalists to suppress dissent and perpetuate the latter party's power. When no state con-
curred in the Resolutions, and several denounced them, the Kentucky legislature reaffirmed its posi-
tion in an additional set of Resolutions in 1799, and Virginia approved a Report drafted by Madison
early in 1800. See J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM 160-81 (1951). The Republicans regarded their
subsequent electoral victory in 1800 as a decisive vindication of the Resolutions by the people, and a
more or less enthusiastic acceptance of the Resolutions was constitutional orthodoxy outside the na-
tionalist Supreme Court before the nullification crisis. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer
Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in T. JEFFERSON, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 151-53
(E. Dumbauld ed. 1955) (describing the 1800 election as a revolution by which "the people" repudi-
ated nationalist "consolidation"); see also Murrin, The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A
Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688- 1721) and America (1776-1816), in
THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 368, 404-28 (J. Pocock ed. 1980) (American
political life in nineteenth century basically adhered to the Jeffersonian "country" ideology).
48. 6 J. CALHOUN, supra note 46, at 41-46.
49. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 44, at 169-73.
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President Jackson answered the following month by issuing an emphati-
cally nationalist proclamation.5
The tariff crisis itself was defused finally by adroit political maneuver-
ing. Congress enacted a Force Act providing Jackson with authority to use
federal arms to enforce the tariff, and then passed a lower tariff economi-
cally acceptable to the Southerners. A South Carolina convention in turn
repealed the nullification of the tariff and nullified the Force Act. 1 Both
sides thus saved face. Perhaps the most lasting effects of the episode were
intellectual. South Carolinians and their allies elsewhere had shown a
willingness to pursue the implications of state sovereignty constitutional-
ism to the logical endpoint of disunion. At the same time, the nationalist
interpretation of the Constitution that the Marshall Court had been up-
holding, often in isolation, during three decades of Republican rule,52
emerged free of its association with Federalist oppression and became a
constituent element of politically popular Jacksonian Democracy. It is
within the context of the nationalist response to the nullification move-
ment5" that the Commentaries must be read. Story's three volumes pro-
vided nationalists with a detailed refutation of the historical and theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the states' rights theory of the Constitution, and
supplied supporters of an expansive domestic role for the federal govern-
ment with a vigorous assertion of the federal government's powers and
50. Story expressed strong approval of Jackson's proclamation, which was published in time for
excerpts from it to be bound at the end of volume two of the Commentaries. "As a state paper," he
wrote, "it is entitled to very high praise for the clearness, force, and eloquence, with which it has
defended the rights and powers of the national government.. . . [It is] among the ablest commentaries
ever offered upon the constitution." II: 543 n.* Privately, Story doubted that Jackson would be will-
ing or able to adhere to the proclamation's stand. See Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters
(Dec. 22, 1832), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 113; Letter from Joseph Story to Judge Fay (Feb. 10,
1833), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 119-21.
51. See STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 44 (reprinting text of state convention ordinances).
52. Every President elected between 1800 and 1836 was elected as a "Republican," even the
nationalist John Quincy Adams. The generally nationalist Whig Party that emerged as an organized
opposition during the Jacksonian era was no direct successor to the defunct Federalists and sought to
link itself to the memory, if not the doctrines, of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. See, e.g.,
Speech by Henry Clay in Hanover County, Virginia (June 27, 1840), reprinted in 6 ANNALS OF
AMERICA 565, 568 (1968) ("The Whigs of 1840 stand where the Republicans of 1798 stood .... ");
see also D. HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 90-91 (1979) (Whig Party
claimed to be heir of Republican party of Jefferson).
53. Early responses in the legal literature to the nullification crisis that adopted the nationalist
position included, in addition to Story's: an appendix Nathan Dane added to his 1829 supplementary
volume to the GENERAL ABRIDGMENT; J. ADAMS, FOURTH OF JULY ORATION (Boston 1831); W.
DUER, OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (New York
1833); P. Du PONCEAU, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadel-
phia 1834); T. WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW (Philadelphia 1837). The first volume
of James Kent's COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (New York 1826), which treated constitutional
issues in accordance with the views expressed by the Marshall Court, appeared before the crisis.
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responsibilities. The Commentaries did not merely offer readers ammuni-
tion for a political debate, however, for in his treatise Joseph Story articu-
lated a coherent theoretical account of the Constitution. It is to that ac-
count we now turn.
II. THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT
For most educated Americans of the early nineteenth century, belief in
"science" was an essential part of the constellation of values that charac-
terized what was best in the new Republic. 54 The "science" they cele-
brated did not, however, include any and all of the areas of human
thought that Western culture had traditionally fit under that rubric." The
hallmark of the type of science these Americans praised was its practical-
ity: Science was valuable and important because it was useful.56 Republi-
cans might indict Federalists for obscurantism, and the latter return the
compliment with charges of visionary madness, but in fact Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams (together with most of their allies and follow-
ers) agreed on the necessity of science to the progress of humanity.5" In
contrast to their perception of Europe as a land where ignorance and op-
pression had historically prevented the triumph of rationality, Americans
believed that their new society could properly calculate its true needs and
wants, and employ the means most likely to achieve those ends.58
Story shared in this general approbation of practically useful knowl-
edge.5" A few months after his inauguration as Dane Professor at
Harvard, Story paid tribute to such knowledge in an address to the Boston
Mechanics' Institute:
If I were called upon to state that which, upon the whole, is the
most striking characteristic of our age, that which in the largest ex-
tent exemplifies its spirit, I should unhesitatingly answer, that it is
the superior attachment to practical science over merely speculative
science. Into whatever department of knowledge we may search, we
shall find that the almost uniform tendency of the last fifty years has
54. See H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 337 (1976) (describing American intellec-
tual acceptance of "science, progress, intellectual freedom, republicanism").
55. According to Doctor Johnson, the word "science" encompassed "[a]ny art or species of knowl-
edge" and more specifically referred to any one of the seven liberal arts, including "rhetorick" and
"musick". See S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE S.V. "science" (London
1755).
56. See D. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213-25 (1948). Perry Miller
remarked that "the gospel of science was, in America, converted to stark utilitarianism." P. MILLER,
supra note 7, at 290.
57. See M. PETERSON, ADAMS AND JEFFERSON: A REVOLUTIONARY DIALOGUE 76-77, 109-11,
116-18 (1976).
58. See H. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON 85-108 (1977).
59. See P. MILLER, supra note 7, at 291-92.
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been to deal less and less with theory, and to confine the attention
more and more to practical results.6"
Concern for "practical science" was for Story the chief engine of
America's increasing prosperity, as well as the source of the dignity that
American society accorded his audience's useful, mechanical arts." Story
did not believe, however, that the realm of science was limited to the
mechanical arts: It also covered the area of his own professional interests.
In his 1834 lecture entitled "The Science of Government,""2 he explained
what it meant to describe the study of government as a "science."
Like any practical science, Story began, the science of government re-
quired a consideration of its "true ends," that is, the practical advantages
to be sought from it. Proper study of government also required an investi-
gation into "the means, by which those ends can be best achieved or pro-
moted."'63 Because government touches on all aspects of human life and
happiness, Story regarded its scientific study as the most intricate and ab-
struse of all human inquiries, one which "admits of very few fixed and
inflexible rules." '64 The means of government must always be adapted to
the actual circumstances of the society to be governed, and the ends appro-
priate in one culture may be undesirable in another: "Government, there-
fore, in a just sense, is, if one may so say, the science of adapta-
tions-variable in its elements, dependent upon circumstances, and
incapable of a rigid mathematical demonstration."6 "
In his exposition of the science of government, Story advocated the bal-
anced consideration of both means and ends. He identified two errors that
arose when this balance was upset. One error, common in authoritarian
or semi-free societies, was to disregard the importance of a government's
form (the means) as long as the private pursuit of happiness was left rela-
tively undisturbed.66 The contrary mistake, a "besetting delusion" in "all
popular governments," was to identify some simple, rigid theory as the
proper principle of government in the abstract and then to adopt that the-
ory as the end or purpose of the actual government.67 Such an approach,
Story argued, must inevitably fail. Except for monarchical despotism, no
60. J. STORY, Developments of Science and Mechanic Art, in WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 475,
478.
61. Id. at 498-501.
62. J. STORY, The Science of Government, in WRrrxNGS, supra note 20, at 614, 616. The idea of
a science of government was a commonplace of Enlightenment thought. See H. COMMAGER, supra
note 58, at 119.
63. J. STORY, supra note 62, at 615.
64. Id. at 616.
65. Id. at 616-17 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 617-18.
67. Id. at 618-19.
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simple governmental theory was practically feasible: "In proportion as a
government is free, it must be complicated." 6 Moreover, the exaltation of
theory turned the means-end relationship on its head, for the "great ob-
ject[]" of government in a free society was not to serve itself or to satisfy
some political theory, but to secure the personal rights, the private prop-
erty, and the public liberty of the people.6 9
Despite the difficulty of the subject, Story expressed confidence that ex-
perience had disclosed the means appropriate to attain the true ends of
free and popular government: the institution and administration of a
"wisely framed" constitution, and the creation of an independent judiciary
to enforce that constitution." In America, characterized as it was by a
complicated federal system and the absence of social checks on rapid
change, there was an especially acute need for the caution and concern for
continuity which only an independent judiciary could provide."
The brief and general portrait of the science of government that Story
presented in his 1834 lecture had been embodied a year earlier, in hun-
dreds of pages and with specific reference to the federal Constitution, in
his Commentaries. Even a cursory reading of the latter reveals Story's
constant and consistent use of the notion of science in his interpretation of
the Constitution. Repeatedly, Story warned that the Constitution must not
be read as the product of "metaphysical . . .subtleties," but instead as a
"practical" instrument, "adapted to the business and exigencies of human
society."'7 2 Unlike the famous philosophers and statesmen of the past, who
fell into "utter folly" because they tried to "establish forms of govern-
ments upon mere theory,"73 the framers of the United States Constitution
were "practical reasoners. ' 7 4 Story admonished his readers to recognize
that the American Constitution was "a new experiment in the history of
nations 175 and to regard the document as the outline of an ongoing institu-
tion rather than as a collection of political dogmas.76 Arguing that it
68. Id. at 619.
69. Id. at 619-20.
70. Id. at 620-21.
71. See id. at 621-27. Story pointed to the necessity of "adjustments" in American government
from time to time to avoid or repair collisions between the various political interest groups; he urged
the use of "caution, skill, and patient investigation" when making such adjustments. Id. at 622.
72. I: 436-37; III: 37; see 1: 392, 439.
73. I: 123 (referring to John Locke's draft constitution for the proprietors of the colony of Caro-
lina). See also II: 7 n.2 (remonstrating against "wild and extravagant" governmental theories of John
Milton); II: 31 n.3 (criticizing David Hume's "extravagant vagaries" and "speculative opinions").
74. I: 439. Compare III: 480-83 (lauding Framers' reliance on practical wisdom) with 1: 120-21
(criticizing strictly theoretical constitution of John Locke). Story's great regard for practical experi-
ence became a guide for his interpretation of the Constitution: "The true and only test [of the mean-
ing of the Constitution] must . . . be experience, which corrects at once the errors of theory." II: 25;
see I: 270-71, 316, 343, 358; II: 407; III: 757-58.
75. III: 686.
76. I: 406-07, 414-17. Cf J. STORY, Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in WRITINGS,
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would have been vain and unscientific to attempt to foresee all the future
needs of the Republic,77 Story concluded that the framers created a Con-
stitution which entrusted the governmental institution with "a very large
mass of discretionary powers" capable of expansion or contraction accord-
ing to circumstances." The exercise of those powers was circumscribed
only by flexible limitations to be adjusted by the federal courts or the
people. 9
The government established by the Constitution is likened in the Com-
mentaries to a "complicated machine.""0 Just as Story admired the experi-
mental progress demonstrated by the scientific mechanical achievements of
the nineteenth century," so he argued that practical governmental experi-
mentation was inherent in the constitutional structure. No matter how
perfectly conceived, a complex machine will often require adjustments in
the designer's functional expectations (the means) so that the machine will
perform the task for which it was designed (the end). 2 In similar fashion,
the great political machine erected and empowered by the Constitution
often worked in ways that its wise master-builders failed to anticipate.
And, so far is it from being true, that the national government has
by its familiarity become more simple and facile in its machinery
and operations, that it may be affirmed, that a far more exact and
comprehensive knowledge is now necessary to preserve its adjust-
ments, and to carry on its daily operations, than was required, or
even dreamed of, at its first institution. . . .And the important
changes in the world during its existence has [sic] required very
many developements of its powers and duties, which could hardly
have occurred, as practical truths to its enlightened founders. 88
History disclosed to Story numerous instances in which early interpre-
tations of the Constitution had been defeated by the actual practice of the
supra note 20, at 503, 528 (instructing law students to "distrust theory, and cling to practical good; to
rely more upon experience than reasoning; more upon institutions than laws").
77. I: 210, 408; III: 22, 111. "[N]o human government can ever be perfect; and . . . it is impos-
sible to foresee, or guard against all the exigencies, which may, in different ages, require different
adaptations and modifications of powers to suit the various necessities of the people." III: 686.
78. 1: 409.
79. III: 483 (judiciary's role); III: 686-87 (adjustment by the people's amending power).
80. I: 400; III: 757-58. See also 1: 492 (amending power "forms great balance-wheel of our
system"); II: 181-82 (Senate is "real balance-wheel"); III: 483 (judiciary is "balance-wheel").
Story's machine seems to have rather too many balance-wheels.
81. J. STORY, supra note 60, at 475, 479-95.
82. Id. at 493-94.
83. II: 84-85. This, Story explained, should cause no surprise to the true political scientist, since
"whatever is practical necessarily deviates from theory." J. STORY, supra note 76, at 512.
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government.8 4 The most striking in his opinion was the complete frustra-
tion of the Framers', and the people's, expectations of how the electoral
college would operate. Intended to serve as independent representatives of
the people's interests in the selection of a chief magistrate, the electors had
become by 1833 the mere registrars of the wishes of those who selected
them. In this manner, "the whole foundation of the system [of presidential
election], so elaborately constructed, is subverted."" 5 This did not mean,
however, that the Constitution's purpose-to select a politically responsi-
ble chief executive-had been frustrated or subverted. It indicated only
that the "complicated machine" had turned out in practice to work some-
what differently than its inventors had imagined. Indeed, Story stated that
for an elector now to exercise independent judgment, as the framers in-
tended, would be "a political usurpation, dishonorable to the individual,
and a fraud upon his constituents. '86 In contrast, Story regarded as radi-
cally defective the constitutional provisions for presidential election by the
House of Representatives in the event no candidate received a majority of
the electoral vote as a serious defect. These provisions were functioning as
expected, but experience had shown that they were an inapposite means
to the Constitution's ends.87
For Story, then, the Constitution's proper interpretation was that which
accorded with its actual and efficient functioning. In his preface to the
first volume of the Commentaries, Story disavowed any desire to present a
"new theory" of the Constitution and promised instead to discuss only
that interpretation which was "confirmed and illustrated by the actual
practice of the government."8 8 He rejected any suggestion that the
mechanics of the constitutional structure were to be construed in light of
some theory they supposedly embodied." The Justice frequently conceded
that the Constitution's practical meaning, while at variance with his con-
struction of the bare text, was settled beyond further contest. 90
The scientific nature of the Constitution required that it, like any other
machine, be subject to periodic fine-tuning, and the wisdom of the Fram-
ers was confirmed for Story by their provision for an independent group
of constitutional mechanics, the federal judiciary. Understanding the les-
sons of history, the Framers "established a balance-wheel, which, by its




88. I: vi. Accord I: 2 (careful review of history of American government necessary for full under-
standing of Constitution); cf. I: 206-08 (best exposition of rightful powers of Continental Congress is
powers it actually exercised).
89. See, e.g., II: 13 (criticizing separation of powers theories), II: 174-77 (senatorial equality of
states not product of theory).
90. See, e.g., I1I: 14, 20, 212, 255-56, 390-97.
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independent structure, should adjust the irregularities, and check the ex-
cesses of the occasional movements of the system." '91 The Supreme Court
was for Story the ultimate "balance-wheel." The Court, therefore, served
as the final interpreter of the constitutional text, not due to any theory
about judicial supremacy, but out of practical necessity: Only the existence
of an orderly method of resolving constitutional disputes and ensuring
uniform obedience to such resolutions could prevent the whole system
from grinding to a halt, or dissolving into anarchy." For problems too
great for judicial adjustment to handle, the Constitution provided a sec-
ond, extraordinary method of incorporating experienced need into the
government-the amendment process. 3 The roadblocks to amendment ac-
corded with the scientific rationale for the amending power. Those obsta-
cles would insure that any change in the text of the Constitution was the
result of deliberate choice, and not of the unthinking passions of the
moment.94
Story's portrayal of a scientific Constitution in the Commentaries can
be seen as part of the broader effort of bench and bar in the first half of
the nineteenth century to distinguish law from politics and morality so as
to insure that the legal profession would control the legal sphere.95 The
image of a "complicated machine" tended by judicial mechanics obviously
fits this pattern, but it is not the only theme of the Commentaries. Story,
acutely aware of the criticisms leveled at the judiciary by Jeffersonians,
Jacksonians, and advocates of states' rights,96 provided a second,
nonmetaphorical description of the constitutionalism for which he was
contending.
III. THE LOGIC OF REPUBLICANISM
If "science" was one of the great values of early nineteenth-century
America, republicanism was its shibboleth. 97 The Jeffersonians' political
triumph, which reduced the Federalists to a dwindling regional minority,
was due in large measure to their success in branding the latter as anti-
91. II 483.
92. I: 352-60.
93. I: 492; III: 685-87.
94. III: 686.
95. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 140-59; P. MILR, supra note 7, at 99-265. On
Story's role in this effort, see G. WHITE, supra note 8, at 43-47.
96. See G. DUNNE, supra note 21, at 215-16, 222-28, 365-68.
97. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 362-66 (1st ed. Paris 1835) (G. Law-
rence trans. 1966) ("the republican principle" dominant in America); see also M. HOLT, THE POLrr-
ICAL CRISIS OF THE 1850s (1978) (pervasive concern in antebellum politics over the preservation of
republicanism); L. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT 194-99 (1970) (Federalist adherence to re-
publican ideal); M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION 7 (1960) (general agreement in Jackso-
nian era regarding "popular" government).
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republican. When nationalist John Quincy Adams, son of the second and
last Federalist President, became chief executive he did so as a Jefferso-
nian Republican, and the party that coalesced around the effort to reelect
him labelled itself the National Republicans. A few years later, when the
nationalist opponents of Andrew Jackson organized, they reached even
further back into America's republican heritage, and called themselves
Whigs." Outside the lingering pockets of Federalist sentiment in New
England it had become political suicide not to insist upon one's whole-
hearted devotion to the values of republicanism as expounded by "the old
Republicans of the Jeffersonian school, the genuine disciples of the Whigs
of '76. '" 9
Young Joseph Story was a Republican, 00 and, despite his dislike for
Jefferson in later years, initially a strong supporter of his party's leader.10 1
Story's role as a Republican congressman in ending the Jefferson admin-
istration's embargo, however, earned for him the President's lasting en-
mity. The publication of Jefferson's papers in 1829 revealed that he had
labelled Story a "pseudo-republican" and argued against Story's appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court.10 Story had fought Jefferson over the em-
bargo affair, but Jefferson's posthumously unveiled attack on his princi-
ples turned political disagreement into intense personal animosity. 03
98. The term "whig" conjured up images of the patriots of the American Revolution, and of the
heroes of the English struggle against Stuart tyranny that culminated in the Glorious Revolution of
1688. Cf I: 310-15 (discussing the views of "the great revolutionary whigs in 1688").
99. THE VIRGINIA AND KENTUcKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND '99, at 2 (J. Elliot ed. 1832)
[hereinafter cited as VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS]. See also Speech by Henry Clay,
supra note 52 (invocation of the doctrines of 1798 by Kentucky Whig).
100. J. STORY, supra note 28, at 1, 20-28.
101. See Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel Fay (May 30, 1807), in I LIFE, supra note 3, at
151-52 (describing meetings with Jefferson, and praising the President).
102. In late 1810, Jefferson wrote Madison reminding him that "Story and [Ezekiel] Baron [Re-
publican congressman from Massachusetts, also under consideration for appointment to the Supreme
Court] are exactly the men who deserted us" on the embargo. Jefferson went on to describe Story as
"unquestionably a tory." G. DUNNE, supra note 21, at 78-79 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison (Oct. 15, 1810)). The "pseudo-republican" slur is quoted in E. BAUER, supra note
2, at 138.
103. Jefferson's accusations that Story's Republicanism was hypocritical clearly rankled. In his
Autobiography, Story went to great lengths to insist that he was a genuine Republican although not
"a mere slave to the opinions of" Jefferson. J. STORY, supra note 28, at 20-21, 26-28, 31-34. As to
the "epithet of "'pseudo-republican"' with which Jefferson had "sullied" Story's character, Story
sarcastically remarked, "'Pseudo-republican,' of course, I must be; as every one was in Mr. Jeffer-
son's opinion, who dared to venture upon a doubt of his infallibility." Id. at 33. Several years later,
explaining his adherence to the Whigs after they became distinct from the Republican Party (which
was by the 1830's usually called the Democratic Party, its alternative label), Story remarked: "I seem
to myself simply to have stood still in my political belief, while parties have revolved about me; so
that, although of the same opinions now as ever, I find my name has changed from Democrat to
Whig, but I know not how or why." 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at 540. In a personal sense the Commenta-
ries were a massive self-vindication by Story the Republican, as well as an indictment of the man
Story personally despised and regarded as the real "pseudo-republican." See III: 408 n.1 (noting
Jefferson's "constant insinuations" against those who disagreed with him).
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Running throughout the Commentaries like a refrain is a series of criti-
cisms of Jefferson remarkable for their acid quality."' While Story some-
times employed personal innuendo, his attack focused predominantly on
Jefferson's political and constitutional opinions, which in 1833 were seen
by many as the intellectual origin of the nullification movement.105 But
Story's rebuttal to Jefferson's libels on his republicanism went beyond
negative counterattack. The Commentaries were a massive attempt to
prove that the doctrines-nationalism, expansive construction of federal
power, and judicial supremacy-for which Story stood and which Jeffer-
son had opposed were in fact the logical conclusions of a truly republican
faith.
At several points in the Commentaries, Story discussed the meaning of
republicanism. He pointed out that not even the opponents of the Consti-
tution's adoption had attempted to deny that the instrument was "strictly
republican," since "all its powers were derived directly or indirectly from
the people, and were administered by functionaries holding their offices
during pleasure, or for a limited period, or during good behavior."'0 6 The
impossibility of choosing these functionaries by universal consent made
majoritarianism, in Story's opinion, a necessary corollary of the republi-
can principle.107 And the corollary of majority rule was the acceptance by
the minority of the majority's decisions.' 0 8 Finally, Story advised, "perfect
equality" was an indispensable basis for republican government, both in
order to avoid dividing the sovereign people into mutually hostile ranks or
estates, and to inculcate that sense of civic pride and duty necessary to the
healthy functioning of majority rule.'0 9
104. 1: 251 n.3, 281 n.2, 346 n.2, 390 n.1, 493 n.1; II: 30 n.2, 353 n.1, 368 n.1, 389 n.1, 457 n.1;
III: 159 n.1, 164 n.1, 199 n.1, 209 n.1, 323 n.2, 356 n.2, 408 n.1, 413 n.1, 476 n.1, 700 n.1, 749 n.1.
105. During the nullification crisis, John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary that Jefferson "more
than any other man, contributed to introduce and make. . . prevalent" what Adams called the "insa-
tiate rage of debating the question of constitutional power upon everything . . . ." J. Q. ADAMS,
Diary (Feb. 1, 1831), in 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 308 (C. Adams ed. 1876). The
nullifiers enthusiastically accepted the mantle of Jefferson. See VIRGINIA AND KENTUcKY RESOLU-
TIONS, supra note 99, at 2 (describing Calhoun's Fort Hill Address, among other documents, as
presenting "the Jeffersonian doctrines of '98"). Madison, on the other hand, regarded the nullifiers'
invocation of Jefferson as a "perverted and disrespectful use" of the dead statesman's authority. Letter
from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Aug. 16, 1829), in 4 J. MADISON, LErERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 43 (Congress ed. Philadelphia 1865). For a discussion of the relation-
ship between Jefferson's thought and the nullification movement, see infra text accompanying notes
112-119.
106. I: 269; see also II: 67 ("[W]hen different legislative bodies are to succeed each other at short
intervals, if the people disapprove of the present, they may rectify its faults, by the silent exercise of
their power in the succeeding election.").
107. I: 299; II: 55-56.
108. I: 299.
109. III: 215. Story also accepted the common argument that a "general equality of the appor-
tionment of property" was correlated closely with the rise and health of republican government.
1: 166-67.
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All of this was perfectly orthodox republican (and Republican) doc-
trine,110 and is paralleled by statements of Jefferson himself.11" ' But Story
derived from these common principles views quite different from those of
the former President on the important constitutional issues of the early
nineteenth century. The nullifiers based their constitutional arguments on
the classic expressions of Republican constitutionalism: the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and the Virginia General As-
sembly's Report of 1800.2 The Resolutions read the Constitution as a
compact between sovereign states rather than as a charter of government
granted by a unitary American people."' This confederative compact was
to be interpreted strictly, in accordance with the "intentions" of the high
contracting parties and with the rule that sovereigns are not presumed to
cede any rights that are not explicitly and expressly delegated.' 14 Since the
federal government created by the compact was the mere creature of the
states, disputes over the constitutional boundary between federal and state
power could not be definitively resolved except by the states themselves.
To permit the Supreme Court to decide these issues would be to vest the
decision in the agent rather than the principal. 15 Despite the objections of
James Madison," 6 the nullifiers invoked Jefferson's writings as support
for their conclusion that each state had the constitutional right to exercise
a type of quasi-judicial review over the constitutionality of federal acts.
The state could void those acts it found unconstitutional, and it could
110. See D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 118-25 (1984); Frisch,
Power and Responsibility: The Republican Statesmanship of Alexander Hamilton, in THE AMERI-
CAN FOUNDING 46, 50-55 (R. Rossum & G. McDowell eds. 1981). Republican commitment to ma-
joritarianism is illustrated by James Madison's observation that "[aiccording to Republican Theory,
right and power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonimous [sic]." 9 J. MADISON,
Vices of the Political System of the United States, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 350 (R.
Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1975).
111. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in T. JEFFERSON,
supra note 47, at 50-53; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander Humboldt (June 13, 1817), in
T. JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 83-84.
112. Madison drafted the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and the Report of 1800, Jefferson the
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798; the authorship of the 1799 Kentucky Resolutions is uncertain. See A.
KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 184-94, 201-07 (1950).
113. As Jefferson explained many years later, "the constitution of the United States is a compact
of independent nations." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Everett (April 8, 1826), in T.
JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 151.
114. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing March 1985).
115. See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 156-57 (Jefferson's draft of the 1798 Kentucky
Resolutions).
116. Although after retirement Madison avoided involvement in political disputes as much as
possible, the invocation by the nullifiers of Jefferson's authority moved Madison to rebut them pub-
licly. See A. KOCH, MADISON'S "ADVICE To My CouNTRY" 126-36 (1966) (discussing Madison's
attack on the nullifiers); see also A. KOCH, supra note 112, at 287-88 (Madison's participation in the
debate over the tariff prompted in part by his desire to "protect the name and memory" of Jefferson
from "political misuse").
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withdraw from the constitutional compact if in its judgment an unremed-
ied usurpation warranted secession.117
Unlike Madison, Story had no interest in vindicating the memory of
Thomas Jefferson and he was happy to equate the latter's views with
those of the South Carolina nullifiers. Story's concern was to demonstrate
that both President Jefferson and Vice President Calhoun"' were guilty
of failure to understand the logic of republicanism. For Story, the entire
edifice of states' rights constitutional theory was erected on an unacknowl-
edged repudiation of the principle of majority rule. The nullifiers, and
before them the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, asserted the right of
a minority (a single state) to reject the decision of the majority (the na-
tion). The states' rights theorists attempted to avoid the anti-majoritarian
implications of their stand by contending that the relevant majority was
the majority within each individual state; they supported this assertion
with the claim that the states as bodies politic had preceded and created
the Union.1" 9
Story dismissed this historical move as false. In his lengthy and elabo-
rate historical survey at the beginning of volume one of the Commenta-
ries, 20 Story labored to show, first, that even before the Revolution, the
American colonists were "for many purposes one people." 2 Furthermore,
the dissolution of royal authority in the separate colonies in 1774-1775
did not, as the South Carolinians claimed, lead to the formation of states
and then to the creation of a league between them, but to the establish-
ment of a de facto and de jure national government, the Continental Con-
gress. 122 The state governments were formed subsequent to the first meet-
ings of the Congress and with its approval, 2 3 and both the declaration and
the achievement of independence were the work of this national revolu-
tionary government. 12  The Articles of Confederation, which Story noted
117. See, e.g., Letter from John Calhoun to Governor James Hamilton, Jr. (Aug. 28, 1832), in 6
J. CALHOUN, supra note 46, at 144-93.
118. Story recognized Calhoun's stature among the states' rights advocates. I: 288 n.1, 11: 431
n.l. Shortly before the publication of the Commentaries, Story described Calhoun, who had resigned
the Vice Presidency and returned to Washington as a U.S. Senator, and Webster as "the great cham-
pions" of the two main schools of constitutional thought. Letter from Joseph Story to John Brazer
(Feb. 11, 1833), in 2 LiFE, supra note 3, at 124.
119. "The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people
of the several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign
capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community .... ." Address
(Fort Hill, July 26, 1831), in 6 J. CALHOUN, supra note 46, at 59, 60.





Whatever, then, may be the theories of ingenious men on the subject, it is historically true, that
before the declaration of independence these colonies were not, in any absolute sense, sovereign
states; that that event did not find them or make them such; but that at the moment of their
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came into effect only in 1781 when independence was practically secured,
were admittedly a compact, but one which illustrated the evils of such an
anti-majoritarian government structure.
125
Having established to his own satisfaction that "the people of the
United States in the aggregate" 2 existed before the ratification of the
Constitution, Story proceeded to draw out the consequences of that histor-
ical "fact.' 127 The relevant majority in federal matters was a majority of
the entire American people, and the Constitution was to be taken at face
value, "as a solemn ordinance and establishment of government," ordained
and established by the American people.'2 8 As a supreme law, enacted by
the appropriate majoritarian "legislature," the Constitution and the fed-
eral laws enacted under it cannot be disobeyed or nullified by a disgrun-
tled minority without the latter giving up its claim to republicanism. The
Supreme Court's claim to final interpretive authority as against the states,
moreover, was not the revolt of a creature against its creators, but the
legitimate assertion of a power granted by the sovereign people. 12 9 There-
fore, in rejecting the Court's authority, the states' rights theorists were
rejecting the most basic principle of the republicanism they purported to
revere.
State sovereignty interpretations of the Constitution had been linked,
since the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, with a particular theory of
constitutional interpretation: The Constitution was to be construed in ac-
cordance with the original "intention" of the contracting parties, the
states. As originally propounded and practiced by Jefferson and Madison,
this interpretive strategy permitted the interpreter to control the text by
separation they were under the dominion of a superior controlling national government, whose
powers were vested in and exercised by the general congress with the consent of the people of
all the states.
I: 202 (footnote omitted).
125. 1: 244-46.
126. I: 332. The expression is Webster's. Cf J. CALHOUN, supra note 119 (rejecting concept of
aggregate American polity).
127. Like Story, Calhoun claimed that his diametrically opposed view of the Constitution
"restled] on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself." J. CALHOUN, supra note 119, at 61.
The arguments of both men, from a more modem viewpoint, are based on a category mistake. It is,
indeed, "historically certain" that the Constitution was ratified by state conventions, but whether we
regard that as evidence that the instrument was a contractual arrangement between distinct communi-
ties, or as simply a product of the physical fact that the people of the United States had nowhere to
meet except in those states, is a matter of legal or philosophical interpretation. The debate between
nationalism and state sovereignty is not in fact capable of historical resolution, save in the pragmatic
sense that later history (the Civil War) settled the question.
128. I: 319. See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.) (Con-
stitution established by "the people" and not by the states). Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that, upon ratification by nine states, the Constitution would be established between those
states, was sometimes invoked as support for the proposition that the Constitution was a contract;
Story's response was that the clause was a majoritarian safeguard intended to prevent a single recalci-
trant state from blocking ratification. III: 709-10.
129. I: 342-43; III: 701.
1304
Vol. 94: 1285, 1985
Joseph Story's Commentaries
inferences drawn from the sovereign character of the states and from the
international law of treaties.1 30 The personal intentions of the Philadel-
phia framers were, on this view, of little or no significance, and the ap-
parent nationalism of the text could be given a meaning more congenial to
state autonomy. Late in his life, Jefferson reiterated the importance of this
"intentionalism" in a letter to Justice William Johnson that was pub-
lished in Jefferson's memoirs in 1829. Jefferson asserted that:
[tihe capital and leading object of the constitution was to leave with
the States all authorities which respected their own citizens only and
to transfer to the United States those which respected citizens of for-
eign or other States, to make us several as to ourselves but one as to
all others. On every question of construction, [we should] carry our-
selves back to the time when the Constitution was adopted, recollect
the spirit manifested in the debates and, instead of trying what
meaning may be squeezed out of the text or invented against it, con-
form to the probable one in which it was passed."'
These two canons of construction were, and were intended to be,1"2 a di-
rect attack on the hermeneutical practices of the Marshall Court. Jeffer-
son's "capital and leading object" rule was a recapitulation of the earlier
Republican argument that the states could not be held to have ceded any
sovereign authority that they did not specifically delegate, and it directly
contradicted the expansive construction of federal power Marshall and
Story derived from their nationalist reading of the Constitution as an act
of the sovereign people.133 The second canon parodied the insistence of
Marshall and Story that the Constitution's text was to be interpreted by a
close examination of its "natural sense.1
13 4
Once again, the Commentaries insisted, Jefferson and his nullifier off-
spring had shown the impurity of their republican faith. Story's attack on
130. See Powell, supra note 114.
131. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in T. JEFFERSON,
supra note 47, at 147-48. Jefferson's advice to "recollect the spirit manifested in the debates" is
somewhat ambiguous, but is probably not a recommendation of "intentionalism" in the modem sense
(i.e., the historical reconstruction of the "intentions" of the Philadelphia framers) but rather a recom-
mendation to read the text against the backdrop of the state ratifying conventions' debates. It is in any
event significant that Jefferson does not suggest historical research into the records of the debates. See
Powell, supra note 114.
132. Jefferson wrote to Justice Johnson in order to voice his opposition to the Court's opinion in
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that U.S. Supreme Court may take
jurisdiction of state criminal case despite Eleventh Amendment). Jefferson also criticized Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson,
supra note 131, at 146-47.
133. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
134. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
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the "intentionalism" of the Jeffersonians135 first made an evidentiary
point: There could be no certainty that the interpreter had correctly ascer-
tained the intentions either of the state conventions, or of the individual
members of those conventions. Furthermore, the very notion of legislative
intention, except as that intention was embodied in the text of the law,
was vacuous.1"6 Finally, and most crucially, to permit the "private inter-
pretation of any particular men," or the "cobwebs of sophistry and meta-
physics about State rights and State sovereignty," to modify the obvious
sense of the text would be to substitute personal fantasy for the deliber-
ately expressed will of the people.137 "The constitution . . . was submitted
to the whole upon a just survey of its provisions, as they stood in the text
itself . . . .Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people." '
Jeffersonian interpretive methodology was, in Story's opinion, a rejection
of the fundamehtal republican principle that all power was derived from
the people, and if the methodology were implemented, it would defeat the
very purpose for which the people adopted the Constitution. The Justice
declared:
It is obvious, that there can be no security to the people in any con-
stitution of government, if they are not to judge of it by the fair
meaning of the words of the text; but the words are to be bent and
broken by the "probable meaning" of persons, whom they never
knew . . . .
135. Story attacked the notion of "intentionalism" in general, I: 388-90, and Jefferson's two
"canons" in particular, 1: 390 n.1.
136. I: 388-89, 390 n.1.
137. I: 390 n.1 ("private interpretation"); 1 LiFE, supra note 3, at 325 ("cobwebs"); see also
III: 754 (criticizing interpretations of Ninth Amendment that "make the sense of the passage bend to
the wishes and prejudices of the interpreter").
138. I: 388-89. Story expanded on this point later in the Commentaries:
But, whatever may have been the private intentions of the framers of the constitution, which
can rarely be established by the mere fact of their votes, it is certain, that the true rule of
interpretation is to ascertain the public and just intention from the language of the instrument
itself, according to the common rules applied to all laws. The people, who adopted the consti-
tution, could know nothing of the private intentions of the framers. They adopted it upon its
own clear import, upon its own naked text. Nothing is more common, than for a law to effect
more or less, than the intention of the persons, who framed it; and it must be judged of by its
words and sense, and not by any private intentions of members of legislature.
III: 143-46 (footnote omitted). It is not accidental that Story's elaborate "preliminary review" of
"constitutional history" prior to adoption passes over the proceedings of the Philadelphia convention
with four words, "[aifter very protracted deliberations." I: 254. Madison's notes of the convention's
debates had not been published, but the official journal and several other minutes of the proceedings
were available. Although Story made use at times of the official journal, his basic attitude was that the
framers' intentions, except as embodied in the text, were irrelevant. See III: 263 ("It has not been
thought any objection to this interpretation, that [it] might not have been primarily, or even second-
arily, within the contemplation of the framers of the constitution, when this clause was introduced.").
139. I: 391 n.1.
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IV. Elegantia Juris: THE PRIMACY OF WORDS
At first glance there appears to be a disharmony between the two domi-
nating motifs of the Commentaries-Story's idealization of a "scientific"
Constitution and the insistence on text-bound interpretation derived from
his republican premise. For the Constitution to accord with the science of
government it must be open-textured and flexible, built to accommodate
the changing needs of the Republic. At the same time, however, Story's
interpretive principle locates the Constitution's meaning in a determinate
text. As a science, constitutional law "must be forever in progress"; 40 as a
form of republican thought, it is bound to the past expression of the will
of the people. The reconciliation of these two themes Story finds, not sur-
prisingly, in the role of the judiciary. The proper function of the federal
courts in the scientific and popular constitutional system is to adjust the
"complicated machine" by an ever more detailed examination of the
meaning of the text. This the judges do by the exercise of the elegantia
juris, the law's search for the most precise terminology and the most dis-
criminating logic. In the preface of the Commentaries, Story praised Chief
Justice Marshall for the "masterly reasoning" which enabled Marshall to
describe the Constitution's meaning "with a precision and clearness ap-
proaching, as near as may be, to mathematical demonstration."1 1 Story
explained his own purpose in writing the Commentaries as the presenta-
tion of "a full analysis" of the Constitution "with clearness and accu-
racy."142 The subsequent three volumes frequently describe constitutional
arguments in terms of "axiom" and "corollaries," ' 3 and focus on the
"force" and "cogency" of reasoning,"" or their absence. 4
For Story, the crucial preliminary step in interpreting the Constitution
was to resolve questions of terminology accurately and precisely. 14 Such
careful consideration of terms was necessary to avoid the danger of a
"solecism of language,"147 the intrinsic pitfall for the constitutional rea-
soner. The false "metaphysics" of states' rights constitutionalism was, he
thought, based on a fundamental misapplication of the terms "compact"
and "sovereign[ty]." Story stressed that the Constitution did not describe
140. Cf J. STORY, supra note 76, at 526 (common law "must be forever in progress"); see also J.
STORY, Life, Character, and Services of Chief Justice Marshall, in WRITINGS, supra note 20, at
639, 695 (constitutional law described as a progressive science).
141. I: vi.
142. 1: 1.
143. See, e.g., I: 425.
144. III: 504-05.
145. III: 717 (argument in The Federalist against the necessity of a bill of rights was an advo-
cate's "argument" rather than a statesman's "reasoning").
146. I: 279-80.
147. I: 310 n.2.
1307
The Yale Law Journal
itself explicitly in contractual language, 4" and he emphasized the presence
of expressions ("ordain and establish," "supreme law," "constitution")
that are not "the usual or appropriate language for mere matters resting.
. . in contract."' 49 Similarly, references to the "sovereignty" of the states
are absent from the Constitution, and rest on a misapprehension of the
term's usage in political science and international law. The European and
monarchical notion that a government properly can be termed sovereign
is, for Story, unacceptable: "Strictly speaking, in our republican forms of
government, the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the
nation."'5 0 Historical references to the states as sovereign used that term
in a "subordinate and limited sense" that has proven misleading, for none
of the states were ever properly "sovereign.' 51 In the derivative sense in
which a republican government can accurately be called "sovereign," it is
the government of the United States that should receive that designa-
tion. 1 2 Thus, Story concluded, the Constitution should be defined as the
sovereign people's establishment of a national government, since "all other
appellations, and definitions of it, such, as that it is a compact, . . . may
mislead us into false constructions and glosses, and can have no tendency
to instruct us in its real objects."' 53
Precision in terminology, while at its most important in the great ques-
tions of constitutional definition, is a concern throughout the Commen-
taries. Whether Story was discussing the American colonists' right to
148. I: 318-22, 332, 335. Story concluded that it was for political reasons, and in accordance with
"artificial reasoning founded upon theory," that the notion of compact had been "with so much inge-
nuity and ability, forced into the language of the constitution, (for the language no where alludes to
it)." I: 341, 343.
149. I: 306-07 & n.1 ("A compact among states is a confederation, and is always so named, (as
was the old confederation) and never a constitution.").
150. I: 194-95.
151. 1: 203-04. See also 1: 191-92 (before Declaration of Independence, none of the colonies
"were, or pretended to be" sovereign states in the proper sense of the term).
152. 111: 124, 154. The image of federal powers being "carved" out of the original totality of
sovereign authority belonging to each individual state and leaving the "residuary mass" of sovereign
powers with each state was prominent in states' rights thought. See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at
157; 1 ST. G. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CON-
STITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA pt. 1, app. 152-53 (Philadelphia 1803); 5 id. at app. 4. Story's his-
torical discussion with its description of the historical priority of a sovereign Continental Congress
over the revolutionary state governments was an implicit repudiation of this imagery. I: 186, 202.
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traditional English privileges, 4 their assemblies' claims to legislative au-
tonomy,1" the meaning of Article I's grants of power,' the status of fed-
eral treaties in judicial proceedings,' 57 or the nature of the "establishment
of religion" prohibited by the first amendment,15 8 his first impulse was to
clarify his terms so as to ensure that he could deduce accurate
conclusions.'5 9
For Thomas Jefferson, the Constitution's interpretation rested on a few
simple principles, accessible to "men of ordinary understanding," and was
not the end-product of judicial attempts to "squeeze" sense out of the
words of the document. For Joseph Story, however, squeezing meaning
out of the Constitution's laconic text was the proper and essential task of
the judge, and he praised the resulting volumes of increasingly compli-
cated judicial exposition. 60
V. CONCLUSION: THE PASSING OF THE OLD CONSTITUTION
Joseph Story was, in one sense of that much-abused term, a deeply
conservative man.' 6 ' In October, 1832, he wrote his friend James Kent to
154. I: 134-38.
155. 1:145.
156. See, e.g., II: 367-69, 379.
157. III: 694-97.
158. III: 722-24.
159. Story's concern for the proper use of language as the essential prerequisite for accurate con-
stitutional interpretation frequently led him in the Commentaries to censure the semantic sloppiness of
other commentators. While Jefferson, of course, attracted the lion's share of Story's terminological
criticism, the Commentaries also took to task many constitutionalists whom Story admired, including
John Quincy Adams (I: 309 n.2), John Jay (I: 295-96, 317 n.1), William Johnson (III: 435 n.1),
James Kent (III: 8 n.2), James Madison (I: 329, 375; II: 372), James Monroe (III: 28 n.2, 152
n.3), and William Rawle (I: 326-27). On one occasion Story gently corrected John Marshall's impre-
cise reference in Gibbons v. Ogden to the states as "sovereign" prior to the Constitution's adoption.
I: 202 n.l. Story often noted how terminological confusion had led a commentator to deduce incorrect
conclusions, e.g, I: 326-27 (Rawle's mistaken acceptance of a state's right to secede stemmed from his
use of compact language for the Constitution), to produce an argument that actually proved the oppo-
site proposition from that which the commentator was trying to establish, e.g., III: 152 n.1 (Monroe's
argument that Congress could not construct roads and canals but could appropriate funds for such
purposes was "irresistible" reasoning in support of the former, broader power), or to refuse to accept
the logical implications of his reasoning, e.g., I: 289 & n.2 (the doctrines of nullification and secession
"flow[ed] naturally" from the compact theory of the Constitution, although some who accepted the
theory did not accept its consequences, including Tucker and Madison).
160. "Let it be remembered, that texts, which scarcely cover the breadth of a finger, have been
since interpreted, explained, limited, and adjusted by judicial commentaries, which are now expanded
into volumes." J. STORY, supra note 140, at 695 (describing with praise Marshall's contributions to
the science of constitutional law). Jefferson would have agreed with Story's description of Marshall's
work, but he would have seen nothing to praise.
161. James McClellan's ambitious study of Story's thought, see J. McCLELLAN, supra note 8,
concludes that Story was the disciple of Edmund Burke in the exposition of "conservative principles,"
and asserts that Story "loved the American Constitution because it was to him a conservative Consti-
tution." Id. at 274, 312. Story unquestionably regarded himself as a "conservative" in later life, see,
e.g., Letter from Joseph Story to Charles Sumner (Aug. 11, 1838), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 300,
and was deeply alarmed at the progress of the Jacksonian Democrats. See G. DUNNE, supra note 21,
at 335-38, 381-84, 423-26. Furthermore, he was an enthusiastic admirer of Burke, whose antipathy
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praise the second edition of the latter's treatise on American law and to
describe briefly his own constitutional Commentaries, then at the pub-
lisher. "They are written," Story avowed, "with a sincere desire to com-
mend, and to recommend the Constitution upon true, old, and elevated
principles. ' 16 2 Despite his belief in progress, the theme of the "old" and
"original" principles of the Constitution recurs throughout his writings,163
and Story viewed himself as unchanging in his essential opinions.164 He
did not claim originality for the views expressed in the Commentaries, and
indeed the individual elements making up those views were, for the most
part, borrowed.165 Nevertheless, the result of Story's efforts to "commend"
the old principles of the Constitution was the creation of a new and radi-
cally different vision of the Constitution, one that undermined the anti-
democratic, property-oriented Constitution of New England Federalism
no less than the states' rights Constitution of the Jeffersonian Republi-
cans. In demonstrating the mutability and adaptability of a "scientific"
Constitution and in developing the republican logic of a "majoritarian"
for theory and reliance on the ongoing traditions of society greatly influenced Story's thinking. But
Story's conservatism existed within a general attitude of support both for popular, majoritarian rule
and for the change which accompanied such rule. Viewing from abroad the more placid British politi-
cal scene, Story expressed to his British correspondents support for extension of the franchise as well
as an equal distaste for both Tories and Radicals. See Letter from Joseph Story to Evelyn Dennison
(Jan. 24, 1832), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 81-82; Letter from Joseph Story to Harriet Martineau
(Jan. 19, 1839), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 308-09. Story's concern over events in his native country
was due in large measure to his fear of too-rapid change; its basic premise was his acceptance of the
republican principle that the majority's will, rather than Burkean tradition, should control. It is
anachronistic to label Story, or Burke for that matter, a "conservative" if that term is used with all of
its modern connotations.
162. Letter from Joseph Story to James Kent (Oct. 27, 1832), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 109.
163. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Story to Sarah Story (March 7, 1819), in 1 LIFE, supra note 3,
at 325.
164. For Story's perception of the consistency of his political views, see supra note 88; he was as
strongly convinced that, on the bench, his judicial views had remained constant, see Letter from Jo-
seph Story to Harriet Martineau (Apr. 7, 1837), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 277.
165. I: vi (Commentaries presents no "novel views" or "new plan of interpreting" the Constitu-
tion). The most powerful influences on Story's constitutional views, as he acknowledged, were The
Federalist and the writings of John Marshall. I: v-vi. Story was indebted deeply to Hamilton's fa-
mous opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank for his approach to construing federal pow-
ers. See 11: 389 n.2; III: 135 n.4, 519 n.1. The influence of Blackstone is often evident, especially in
Story's views on the ultimate uncontrollability of sovereign power (although Story, as noted above,
applies the notion to the people rather than to the legislature as did Blackstone). 1: 191-93 (meaning
of "sovereignty"); I: 383-84 (on methods of constitutional interpretation); II: 4-5 (value of separa-
tion of powers). Burke, although seldom cited in the Commentaries, was the apparent source of many
of Story's ideas about the impossibility of constructing government solely on theoretical grounds, and
about the wisdom of changing institutions only slowly. But Story understood Burke as a participant in
the Anglo-American Whig tradition of 1688 and 1776, not as a reactionary conservative. See II: 49
n.4 (on propriety of the people choosing representatives directly, Story contrasted Burke's firm sup-
port with equivocal statement by Jefferson); see also I: 315 & n.2 (listing, as in agreement on the
sovereign power of the people, "the great revolutionary whigs in 1688," "the great Whig leaders of
the House of Commons . . .in 1709," and "Mr. Burke").
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Constitution, Story was forced radically to circumscribe the Constitution's
protection of substantive values.1 6
Story's personal devotion to certain substantive legal values was strong.
The preservation of the "principles of justice" was for Story one of the
most basic purposes of any government, and one of the defining character-
istics of "free" government. 6 ' The inability of the Articles of Confedera-
tion to fulfill this goal was, he emphasized, one of the causes for the fram-
ing and adoption of the Constitution, a motive reflected in its preamble's
explicit commitment to the "establish[ment of] justice."' 8 Story's concep-
tion of justice encompassed not only the mere satisfaction of procedural
regularity, but the substantive protection of an individual's "character
[and] fortune [and] life"' 69 as well: "The fundamental maxims of a free
government seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty, and pri-
vate property, should be held sacred.'1
70
In his early years as a judge, Story suggested on occasion that the fed-
eral judiciary could enforce these rules of natural justice even apart from
specific constitutional provisions.17 1 It is striking, therefore, that the Com-
mentaries repeatedly describe the Constitution's protection of these rights
as relative, and not absolute. By 1833, Story's view was that the sovereign
government of the people could have no ultimate limits except those ac-
cepted by the majority through considerations of "policy, or convenience,
or justice.' 7 2 If the majority chose to endorse oppression through constitu-
tional forms, those whose rights were infringed had only "the ultimate
appeal to the good sense, and integrity, and justice of the majority of the
people.' 73 Such majoritarian oppression, Story conceded, was "certainly
irremediable under any known forms of the constitution," for the amend-
ing power permitted the majority, with almost no limitations, to "change
the whole structure and powers of the government, and thus legalize any
166. From a modern perspective, the Commentaries proposed a "process-based" view of the Con-
stitution. See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1980). Story's vision is, of course, not a pure process-based theory, for he also openly
embraced certain substantive values, something that "process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid."
Id. at 1064.
167. I: 262-63, 463-64.
168. I: 463-70.
169. J. STORY, Progress ofJurisprudence, in WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 198, 227. See also
Story, Natural Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (F. Lieber ed. 1836), reprinted in J.
MCCLELLAN, supra note 8, at 313, 315 ("man has a perfect [determinate] right to his life, to his
personal liberty, and to his property").
170. III: 268.
171. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815); United States v. La Jeune
Eugenic, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
172. II: 55. See 1: 194, 299-300.
173. 1: 306.
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present excess of power."'17 4 The Constitution, designed to establish jus-
tice, might become-constitutionally-the instrument of injustice. 17' The
oppressed would be bound legally and perhaps morally to submit. 17 6 Story
considered the Constitution's restraints on majoritarianism, especially the
independent judiciary and the complicated amendment process,' 7" valuable
because they provided checks on hasty political passions, "the momentary
ebullitions of those, who act for the majority, for a day, or a month, or a
year." M78 But Story believed that, even with respect to private property
rights, there were no final limitations on a decision by the majority. 1 9
Story came close to admitting the existence of immutable legal limits on
majoritarian rule in his discussion of the Constitution's interdiction of
state impairment of contracts.' 80 After listing the potentially unjust acts
that the Constitution did not forbid, Story raised the question whether
"independently of the constitution of the United States, the nature of re-
publican and free governments does not necessarily impose some restraints
upon the legislative power."' 8' He noted the widespread judicial opinion
that no state government "can be presumed to possess the trancendental
sovereignty" enabling it to transfer private property from one individual
to another by legislative act.'8 2 No American court "would be warranted
in assuming" that a power "so repugnant to the common principles of
justice and civil liberty, lurked under any general grant of legislative au-
thority," since "[t]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free,
where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon a legislative
body, without any restraint."' For all this rhetoric, however, Story could
find only a presumption against legislative power to destroy vested prop-
erty rights. His argument concluded that judicial protection of property
would have to bow to a "very strong, and positive declaration" that the
sovereign people had delegated to their legislature that power. 84 Thus,
174. I: 374.
175. III: 538-39.
176. Compare I: 302 n.2 (claiming that right of minority to withdraw from government or to
overthrow it "has no foundation in any just reasoning") with I: 374-75 (arguing that if there exists a
remedy for constitutional oppression, it is "a remedy never provided for by human institutions. It is by
a resort to the ultimate right of all human beings . . . to apply force against ruinous injustice.").
Story's later expressions of a belief in absolute limits on the will of the majority in his private corre-
spondence, e.g., Letter from Joseph Story to Francis Lieber (Aug. 15, 1837), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3,
at 278, presumably refer to moral rather than legal limits.
177. III: 473, 686.
178. III: 473. See also I: 267 (Constitution's complicated structure fulfills the need to "check, as
well as enlighten, public opinion").
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Story clearly conceded that there were not, and in a republican polity
should not be, any limitations on the deliberate decision of the majority.
Story believed that the subordination of the Constitution to the consid-
ered will of the majority solved one of the most discussed problems of
antebellum constitutional discourse, the idea of constitutional "perver-
sion." As explained by Calhoun:
There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions on the part
of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a judicial
tribunal, cannot, from its nature, take cognizance ... [such as]
where Congress perverts a power from an object intended, to one
not intended, the most insidious and dangerous of all infractions;
and which may be extended to all of its powers ....185
To the proponents of nullification, the tariff of abominations was a prime
example of perversion. The Constitution undeniably delegated to Con-
gress the power to impose a tariff,"8 6 but it did so, the argument went, to
enable Congress to raise revenue. The challenged act was a perversion of
the power because it was designed instead to protect Northern manufac-
turing interests against foreign imports.
Story's response to the concept of constitutional "perversion" was two-
fold. First, he pointed out the difficulties accompanying any attempt to
discern an illegitimate purpose behind congressional exercise of a dele-
gated power. 1 7 But the states' rights theorists accepted the existence of
this evidentiary problem, and used it as a justification for claiming for the
states final interpretive authority in matters of federal power. 88 Story's
second, and more basic, objection to the concept of "perversion" was that
it was fundamentally anti-majoritarian. He conceded that, as an exercise
of thought, "cases may readily be imagined, in which a tax may be laid,
or a treaty made, upon motives and grounds wholly beside the intention of
the constitution."' 8 But he insisted that the remedy in such cases "is
solely by an appeal to the people at the elections; or by the salutary power
of amendment."' 90 Therefore, "[ijf the oppression be in the exercise of
powers clearly constitutional, and the people refuse to interfere in this
185. J. CALHOUN, supra note 119, at 70 (emphasis in original).
186. U.S. CONs-r. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
187. Story observed that such an attempt would require "an inquisition into the motives of every
member," an impossibility since the motives of many would either be mixed, self-contradictory or
"incapable of ascertainment." Even more fundamentally for Story, reliance on the reviewer's recon-
struction of congressional motives could entail rejecting "the written intent of the legislature" for
"conjecture, and parol declarations, and fleeting reveries, and heated imaginations." II: 533-34.
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manner, then indeed, the party must submit to the wrong .. ,19 Story
was thus driven by the logic of his argument to deny the propriety or
possibility of final limits on governmental power at a time when that
power was in the hands of men with whom he disagreed on fundamental
issues.1 2 Story's very real despair at the political course set by the
Jacksonian Democracy was predicated on his intellectual acceptance of
the constitutionality of the majority's choice. 93
The constitutional vision presented in the Commentaries is a curiously
modern one. We have accepted, for the most part, Story's rejection of the
concepts of constitutional compact, interposition, nullification, and consti-
tutional perversion that were the stock in trade of early nineteenth century
discussion. Story's "scientific" view of the Constitution's flexibility, and its
corollary the omni-competent federal government, triumphed during the
New Deal era. His majoritarianism has been a recurrent theme, albeit
with rather different nuances, of both the Warren and the Burger Courts.
Even the form of Story's argument, with its reliance on Supreme Court
opinions and legal commentaries to the virtual exclusion of the broader
vistas of ethics and political philosophy, can be discerned in the pages of
the Commentaries' most recent descendant.' The Commentaries provide
the prime example of the nineteenth century's translation of the basic
questions of American political values into those narrow confines of legal
idiom that today still dominate constitutional discussion. It is ironic that
Joseph Story, who described himself only a few years later as "a monu-
ment of the past age, and a mere record of the dead,"' 95 should have cre-
ated in his Commentaries so perfect a reflection of the future.
191. III: 539.
192. Despite his approval of Jackson's nationalist stand during the nullification crisis, Story re-
garded most of the other prominent measures of that administration as wrong-headed and even uncon-
stitutional. 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 207-08. Soon after Jackson left office, Story wrote his colleague
John McLean that the "state of unexampled distress and suffering" in which the country found itself
was the "natural effect" of the "experiments of General Jackson." "Will the people awake to their
rights and duties? I fear not. They have become stupefied, and are led on to their ruin by the arts of
demagogues and the corrupted influences of party ...." Letter from Joseph Story to John McLean
(May 10, 1837), in 2 LIFE, supra note 3, at 273. This harsh retrospective judgment on Jackson's
presidency corresponded with Story's earlier fears. See Letter from Joseph Story to Ezekiel Bacon
(Aug. 3, 1828), in 1 LIFE, supra note 3, at 538 (approaching election "momentous, both in principles
and consequences"; Story "sincerely anxious" for Adams' reelection).
193. This despair, which Story sometimes expressed privately in very strong language, see, e.g.,
Letter from Joseph Story to Justice John McLean (Aug. 16, 1844), reprinted in C. SwisHs.R, THE
TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 43 (1974), must be understood in conjunction with his publicly expressed
support, in the Commentaries and elsewhere, for majority rule, and with the evidence that he was
saddened, not confirmed, by his personal views regarding the apparent failure of republicanism in
America. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Story to William W. Story (Jan. 25, 1845), in 2 LIFE, supra
note 3, at 510-11.
194. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). I am not suggesting that Tribe is
himself unaware of these vistas.
195. Letter from Joseph Story to Harriet Martineau (Feb. 8, 1836), in 2 LIFE, supra note 2, at
226.
1314
Vol. 94: 1285, 1985
The Editors dedicate this issue to Professor Rostow
for his distinguished career as a scholar, Dean of the Yale
Law School, and public servant. His vision, his courage,
and his devotion to the rule of law in domestic and inter-
national affairs have inspired his students and his
colleagues.
Eugene V. Rostow
